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Abstract 
Soils are a form of natural capital that support economic activity and human well-being. However, in 
England, national soil resources have been degrading over the last two centuries. The total annual 
economic cost of soil degradation is significant, making the issue a national policy priority. A 
government advisory committee has recommended that investment in natural capital is needed to 
restore natural capital stocks such as soils. However, the dynamic interactions between soil health 
and systems of financial incentives are not clear, meaning that natural capital investments could 
produce unintended effects. In this thesis, secondary data were used to build a quantitative system 
dynamics model capable of reproducing historically declining trends in the soil health and natural 
capital indicator soil organic carbon (SOC). The model built on a pre-existing SOC model to 
operationalise the relationships between the indicator, the economic value of soil ecosystem services 
and land management decision processes. The model was used to clarify the structural mechanisms 
behind soil degradation and identify leverage points at which natural capital investments could be 
targeted to reverse the trend. The work confirmed that stocks of SOC are declining because the inflows 
of carbon from organic matter have historically been smaller than the outflows of organic matter 
decay. Analyses revealed the absence of a feedback mechanism by which land managers could 
account for the improvements or losses of soil ecosystem services in their business decisions, 
suggesting that there is no incentive to alter land management choices based on SOC levels. The model 
thus provided a quantified, operational representation of a hypothesis posed by earlier research that 
soil degradation is happening because its economic impact is an externality for the land user. On this 
basis the study identified land managers’ accounting and decision-making processes as leverage points 
for natural capital investment. The model was used to design and test two types of investments that 
would introduce feedback mechanisms: a farm advisory service to enable land managers to account 
for the onsite ecosystem services value to their business of improving SOC stocks, and a payment for 
ecosystem services (PES) whereby offsite beneficiaries pay land managers for the economic benefits 
they experience when SOC loss is reversed. The study found that the policies’ effectiveness differed 
depending on the initial SOC stock level of the land plot to which the investment was targeted. The 
reasons behind these findings were determined to be the slow and non-linear rate of SOC 
accumulation originating in biophysical stock and flow structures, and the high sensitivity of land 
management decisions to price and supply variables for organic materials. These findings can be 
generalised to inform the discussion on how natural capital investment could be used to improve 
other soil health indicators, as well as other types of natural assets. Further work is proposed for using 
the simulation model as a facilitation tool to explore the issue with policy stakeholders and as a natural 
capital investment appraisal tool for investors and suppliers.  
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Soils can be considered a form of natural capital because they are stocks of natural assets which 
provide ecosystem services that support economic activities and human well-being (Brady & Weil, 
2016; Costanza & Daly, 1992; Dominati et al., 2010). Examples of ecosystem services that soils provide 
include supporting the provision of food and fibre and their role in storing greenhouse gases which 
regulate climate. However, the status of global soil resources is considered poor and their condition 
to be worsening (FAO, 2016). In England, national soil resources have degraded over the last two 
centuries due to the practices associated with their use and environmental pollution (Defra, 2009). In 
2017 the UK’s Environment Minister warned that some parts of the country were “30 to 40 years away 
from the fundamental eradication of soil fertility” (Van der Zee, 2017, p. 1). The total economic cost 
of soil degradation in England and Wales has been estimated at £1.2 billion per year (Graves et al., 
2015). Addressing soil degradation can therefore be considered a national policy priority. 
As part of a new 25-year strategic plan, the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(“Defra”) has set the goal that “by 2030 we want all of England’s soils to be managed sustainably, and 
we will use natural capital thinking to develop appropriate soil metrics and management approaches.” 
(HM Government, 2018, p. 27). The Natural Capital Committee (2018), an independent advisory 
committee which provides advice to the UK government on the sustainable use of natural capital, has 
emphasised the importance of investment in natural capital for achieving Defra’s 25-year vision. The 
business case for private investment in Britain’s soil natural capital has also been made (Sustainable 
Soils Alliance, 2019) referring to soil’s role in supporting supply chain resilience, mitigating financial 
risk and as an opportunity to capitalise on consumers’ sustainability concerns (Davies, 2017; World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2018). Figure 1 illustrates some of the benefits soils 
provide, how soils might be degraded by damaging practices, and shows how investing in soils can 
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1.2 Research challenges 
 
Since the soil environment can be considered a dynamic ecosystem (Brady & Weil, 2016), itself 
embedded in a complex socio-ecological system (Levin et al., 2012), proposals for investment in 
restoring soil natural capital and supporting policies must take account of the complex feedback 
relationships that characterise such systems and that could promote or hinder the success of these 
initiatives. Feedback processes interrelating the benefits humans receive from natural capital and how 
decisions are made about its management by people are part of the ecosystem services theoretical 
framework described in the relevant scientific literature (Braat & de Groot, 2012). Supposed feedback 
relationships interrelating investments, natural capital benefits, returns for the investor, and money 
available for future natural capital investments are also widely illustrated in the conceptual diagrams 
of publications aimed at business audiences, such as the Natural Capital Protocol (Natural Capital 
Coalition, 2016), a recent natural capital credit risk assessment in agricultural lending (Ascui & 
Cojoianu, 2019), and the seminal Nature article on the business case for investing in soils by Davies 
(2017) (see Figure 1). In their calculation of the total economic costs of soil degradation in England 
and Wales, Graves et al. (2015) refer to the current absence of such feedback mechanisms as an 
instance of market and institutional failure which has led to the most significant costs of soil 
degradation being borne by off-site actors (externalities), such as water companies, local councils and 
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national governments. This absence of an incentive for soil users to employ more sustainable 
management practices was therefore proposed by these authors as an explanation for why soil 
degradation is occurring. 
Academic publications in the soil science, natural capital and land use policy literature have focused 
on the not insignificant task of elucidating the logic pathways behind how stocks of soil natural capital 
deliver benefits for human society (for example, Dominati et al., 2010; Hewitt et al., 2015; Janes-Basset 
& Davies, 2018). Such work supports the policy and business case for tackling soil degradation, and for 
recognising the valuable role of soils for delivering public and private goods in decision-making 
processes. However, it is also apparent from the academic literature in this area that neither the 
existence (or absence) of dynamic feedback relationships between soil health, allocations of financial 
resources and land management decisions, nor their potential policy and business implications, have 
been studied explicitly. This represents a challenge for policy makers and business communities 
seeking to improve soil health using natural capital investments because the appropriate scientific 
evidence available to inform their proposals is scarce. Recognising this, the use of systems analysis 
techniques for understanding how soil and money interact has been proposed by the Sustainable Soils 
Alliance (2018), a campaign organisation which aims to improve the understanding and the health of 
UK soils. There is therefore a clear need to broaden the focus of the existing research agenda to 
investigate the potential for harnessing and/or creating dynamic feedback processes to reverse soil 
degradation using natural capital investments. 
Figure 2a and 2b summarise the issue in causal loop diagrams (CLDs). Figure 2a (top) illustrates how 
both regenerative and damaging soil management practices are influenced by existing financial 
incentives and policies but are not based on changes in the value of ecosystem services provided by 
soils. Figure 2b (bottom) illustrates the theoretical mechanism by which natural capital investment is 
supposed to incentivise regenerating practices and reduce damaging practices. Natural capital 
investments are implicitly discussed as representing introducing reinforcing feedback mechanisms 
(e.g. Davies, 2017; Ascui & Cojoianu, 2019) because improving soil health should improve ecosystem 
services delivery, their economic value, and therefore the returns on natural capital investment which 
can provide more funds for further investment. These ideas are deserving of further exploration given 
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Figure 2a (top) and Figure 2b (bottom): causal structure of the supposed “market failure” which has 
led to soil degradation and the supposed mechanism by which natural capital investment can 
introduce a reinforcing feedback to incentivise regenerative practices. Adapted from Graves et al. 
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In addition to this theoretical challenge, the practical challenge of developing new decision support 
tools capable of informing natural capital investment appraisals has been recognised by the Natural 
Capital Committee (2018). A range of natural capital and ecosystem services assessment tools already 
exist with well-documented case studies on their use in both research and commercial applications 
(Howard et al., 2016), including highly sophisticated data-driven spatially-referenced models such as 
Viridian (Ecosystems Knowledge Network, 2017), as well as more conceptual visualisation aids such as 
ENCORE (Natural Capital Finance Alliance, 2019). None of these existing tools are currently able to 
operationalise the dynamic feedback relationships between soil natural capital stocks, the economic 
value of their ecosystem services benefits, systems of financial return for investors and land 
management decision processes. This represents a challenge for researchers as well as policy makers 
and business communities because the available appraisal tools are underdeveloped for informing 
their decisions or addressing the theoretical challenge outlined earlier. This research project 
recognises this practical challenge and was designed accordingly. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 
The overall aim of this research is to clarify the dynamic interactions between soil health and money 
to explore why soil degradation might occur and evaluate the potential for natural capital investments 
to reverse it. In the context of the background and theoretical challenge outlined above, this research 
aim was elaborated into two specific Research Objectives: 
1. Identify dynamic structures underlying soil natural capital degradation in England, highlighting 
dynamics linking soil health to systems of financial investments and incentives; 
2. Use these dynamic structures to identify opportunities and limitations for the effectiveness of 
natural capital investments in regenerating soils in England. 
To fulfil these objectives and address the theoretical challenge, this research required the 
development of a prototype soil natural capital investment appraisal tool which took the form of a 
dynamic simulation model. The development of such a tool was necessary in the context posed by the 
practical challenge mentioned above. Although developing this tool was not a formal research 
objective this was considered a valuable research output and potential for further applications and 
development are included in the text to support future work. 
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1.4 Research Questions 
 
The following Research Questions were developed for this study based on the Research Objectives. 
The type of knowledge sought is indicated in brackets. 
 
Objective 1: 
1.1. Which dynamic structures could be responsible for promoting the decline of soil natural 
capital in England? (explanatory) 
1.2. Which dynamic structures could be responsible for mitigating or slowing the decline in 
soil natural capital in England? (explanatory) 




2.1. What are the leverage points in the dynamic structures of the system for reversing the 
decline in soil natural capital in England using natural capital investments? (predictive) 
2.2. What are the strengths and opportunities for using natural capital investments to exploit 
these leverage points in the system structure for restoring soil natural capital? (evaluative) 
2.3. What are the limitations and risks for using natural capital investments to exploit these 
leverage points in the system structure for restoring soil natural capital? (evaluative) 
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Chapter 2. Methods 
 
2.1 Research Strategy 
 
System Dynamics (SD) was chosen as the overall research methodology for this study. SD has been 
defined as “the use of informal maps and formal models with computer simulation to uncover and 
understand endogenous sources of system behaviour” (Richardson, 2011, p. 241). SD could be 
described as a mixed methods research approach since it combines qualitative and quantitative 
elements (Denscombe, 2012; Sterman, 2000). Turner et al. (2016) have argued that SD is “uniquely 
suited to investigate AGNR [agricultural and natural resource problems] given their inherently 
complex behaviours” (p. 1) and demonstrates how SD models have produced novel insights in this 
context. In cases related to soil erosion and sedimentation of watercourses, studies reported that 
using SD models offered advantages in exploring alternative scenarios, highlighting previously 
unrecognised feedback processes and identifying leverage points for policy design (Yeh et al., 2006; 
Cakula et al., 2012). Gerber (2016) has demonstrated the advantage of SD in exploring the dynamic 
relationships between financial incentives for farmers, food production and soil parameters. Given 
the focus of this study on the dynamic relationships between soil and money in a complex system and 
the potential role of simulation identifying leverage points for natural capital interventions, the 
rationale for adopting SD as the overall research method was supported by the foregoing precedents. 
SD is itself a broad methodology and includes a range of approaches as classified and described by De 
Gooyert (2018). Considering the Research Objectives and Research Questions posed above, the SD 
research strategy adopted for this study resembles the so-called Phenomenon Replicating Explanation 
Strategy. This approach focuses on using existing knowledge and empirical data to build a quantitative 
model capable of reproducing a reference mode of behaviour which is used to compare scenarios for 
developing new policy insights. This is similar to the strategy employed by Gerber (2016) for building 
a simulation model to study the dynamics between food production and fertiliser subsidies in Zambia, 
where existing knowledge was synthesised to produce a high-level, aggregated model to clarify the 
structural mechanisms behind a system’s complex dynamics and identify strategic leverage points of 
policy interest. Given that a large archive of documented information is already available on the issue 
of soil degradation and land management decision-making in England, and that the focus of this work 
is on developing policy insights regarding the opportunities and limitations of natural capital 
investment, this SD research strategy was considered appropriate for fulfilling the Research Objectives 
of this study. 
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Following accepted SD guidance, iterative cycles of data collection, model building, simulation, 
analysis, validation and documentation were undertaken throughout the project (Sterman, 2000) 
adhering to the “Agile SD” principles (Warren, 2015). This allowed preliminary answers to Research 
Questions 1.1 to 2.3 to be revised with increasing confidence as the iterative cycles progressed and 
enabled different research activities to be conducted in parallel to improve efficiency. Given that soil 
degradation and natural capital investment are high-profile topics where the public discourse and 
state of existing knowledge is rapidly changing, the iterative method also enabled the most up-to-date 
information to be incorporated. The SD model was built and used in the Stella Architect software (isee 
Systems, 2019). 
 
2.2 Data Collection 
 
Two types of information were sought in order to build, test, validate and use the SD model for 
addressing the Research Questions: 
• Nature of the structural components in the complex system that has produced the problem 
of soil degradation in England, particularly those relating to connections between soils and 
financial variables, including stock, flow and exogenous variables, causal relationships, and 
equations which describe the relationships between variables; 
• Time series data for known modes of behaviour, such as data plotting behaviour of soil health 
indicators over time, and parameter data for exogenous variables. 
Data sources often used in SD studies include documented numerical data, documented written data 
and mental data present in the minds of people operating within the system being studied (Forrester, 
1992). Because of the large quantity of documented information, only the first two types of data 
sources were consulted, and no primary data collection was conducted. The secondary data was 
sought in peer-reviewed scientific literature using the Web of Science database and from “grey 
literature” including governmental and commercial reports. Relevant existing simulation models were 
also reviewed such that any pertinent structures, input parameter values, and output data could be 
used to build an integrated model (Voinov & Shugart, 2013). Such an approach was taken to improve 
model-building efficiency and to improve model confidence by incorporating pre-validated simulation 
model components. The International Soil Modelling Consortium (ISMC) model database (ISMC, 2019) 
was consulted to identify relevant existing simulation models. Only public and academically-licensed 
secondary information was consulted and only sufficiently validated, fully documented simulation 
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model components (adhering to the minimum requirements of Rahmandad & Sterman, 2012) were 
used. 
Given the multidisciplinary focus of the research, relevant secondary data and existing simulation 
models can be found across a multiplicity of sources and research domains. Since an iterative, agile 
modelling approach was adopted for the reasons outlined above, a traditional systematic literature 
review was not undertaken to collect the necessary data. Instead, as part of each iterative learning 
cycle, a model gap analysis was performed to identify model exclusions, weaknesses, sensitivities and 
uncertainties. These gaps were then used in the next modelling iteration to devise search terms by 
which to identify relevant documents for review, and the desired information was extracted if present. 
The development of the simulation model to supply answers to the Research Questions with 
increasing confidence and validity led the secondary data collection process in this way. The model 
description (Chapter 3) and results of analysis (Chapter 4) reported in this thesis thus represent the 
synthesis of the existing literature and critical discussion at the end of this iterative process. 
Table 1 summarises the data collection methods used in this study, including examples of data 
sources, how the data was collected and processed, the contribution of the data to the study and 
access considerations. 
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Table 1: Summary of data sources, collection, processing and access 
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2.3 Data Analysis 
 
Following guidelines and techniques described by Barlas (1996) and Sterman (2000), formal model 
analysis and validation procedures were used to support model testing throughout the iterative 
research process. Partial model testing (Homer, 2012) was used to test and validate smaller model 
building blocks by identifying areas for improvement and/or additional data collection as early as 
possible. The purpose of the model analysis and validation was to: 
1. Support an overall evaluation of the extent to which the model can be used with confidence 
to address the Research Questions; 
2. Inform a deeper interpretation of model behaviour; and, 
3. Highlight leverage points and challenges for natural capital investments to promote desired 
system behaviour. 
Direct structure tests, indirect structure-oriented tests and behaviour tests were used, with tests for 
building confidence in model structure prioritised in advance of model behaviour tests (Barlas, 1996; 
Sterman, 2000). For example, Structure Confirmation is a Direct Structure Test in which the variables 
and causal relationships which control an important soil health stock variable were validated by 
comparing model flow equations with those documented in soil science literature, whereas qualitative 
Behaviour Reproduction Tests were used to compare outputs of partial model tests with patterns 
(direction, shape, magnitude) of empirical reference modes (Barlas, 1996). The results of all validation 
tests were used for interpreting internally generated model outputs to address the Research 
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Chapter 3. Model Description 
 
This Chapter presents a detailed description of the model which was developed to answer the 
Research Questions of this study. The model was built in iterative learning cycles and the model 
described here is the final product of the process. This model therefore represents both a quantified, 
operational and testable synthesis of existing literature as well as a prototype natural capital 
investment appraisal tool. A critical evaluation is provided in the text and further developed in Chapter 
4 in the model analysis and validation testing. 
As an initial overview, the model consists of the following sectors: 
• A structure representing the biophysical processes controlling the soil health and natural 
capital indicator soil organic carbon (SOC) – this model core is based on the pre-existing RothC-
26.3; 
• A structure which operationalises the delivery of ecosystem services to onsite actors (land 
managers, farmers) from changes in SOC and a structure which quantifies the economic value 
of these onsite ecosystem services; 
• A structure which operationalises the delivery of ecosystem services to offsite actors (water 
companies, local councils, national governments) from changes in SOC and a structure which 
quantifies the economic value of these offsite ecosystem services; 
• A structure representing the decision process that land managers use to determine how much 
organic materials to add to their soil. 
These sectors and their relationships are illustrated in the model overview presented in Figure 3. As 
shown, no feedbacks are present between the offsite costs and benefits of changes in ecosystem 
services delivery, and the potential feedback from the onsite costs and benefits of changes in 
ecosystem services delivery is portrayed as inactive (red). The remainder of this Chapter will describe 
the model in further detail and demonstrate its grounding in academic literature and documentary 
evidence. An overview of the feedback mechanisms in the model are illustrated in Figure 12 at the 
end of this Chapter. 
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3.1 Soil natural capital 
 
3.1.1 Soil health indicators as natural capital stocks 
 
Despite the existence of a range of soil health indicators (e.g. Lima et al., 2013), integrated soil quality 
indices (e.g. Obade & Lal, 2016) and soil ecosystem services metrics (e.g. Greiner et al., 2017), there is 
still no standardised set of soil health indicators (FAO, 2015; Defra, 2018a). In order that soil natural 
capital could be modelled quantitatively to answer the Research Questions of this study, criteria were 
developed by which soil health indicators listed in the relevant scientific and policy literature could be 
reviewed. These criteria determined whether a soil health indicator was: 
• Representative of a soil’s qualitative state at a point in time and which may change over time 
i.e. a stock variable (Sterman, 2000); 
• Manageable i.e. responsive to active management (Dominati et al., 2010); 
• Widely considered critical to a soil’s supply of ecosystem services (Greiner et al., 2017); 
• Operational with standardised units of measure. 
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Soil organic carbon (SOC), which is a measure of a soil’s organic matter (SOM) content, meets these 
criteria because SOC is: 
• A stock variable which can accumulate or deplete over time (Coleman & Jenkinson, 1996); 
• Responsive to active management, such as through applications of organic amendments like 
manures (Minasny et al, 2017); 
• Widely referenced as a soil health indicator or used in integrated indices (Huber et al., 2008; 
FAO, 2015; Obade & Lal, 2016; Sustainable Soils Alliance, 2019) and is considered critical to 
soil’s delivery of ecosystem services such as food provision and climate regulation (Graves et 
al., 2015); 
• Measured and reported in standardised operational units of tons of carbon per hectare (Mg 
C ha-1) or carbon as a percentage of the total soil weight (% w/w) specified to a certain soil 
depth (Huber et al., 2008). 
Although other soil health indicators such as available water capacity and earthworm biomass could 
also meet these criteria, SOC is widely considered to be the highest priority indicator for policy makers 
(Graves et al., 2015; FAO, 2016; Sustainable Soils Alliance, 2019). The model was therefore limited to 
focusing on SOC as the main soil natural capital stock with other soil health indicators included only in 
so far as they are dynamically related to SOC. This was a boundary decision relating to the model and 
prototype natural capital investment appraisal tool developed here, but other indicators of interest 
could be included in future work building on this thesis. 
Available SOC data shows a declining historic trend at the national level (Rusco et al., 2001; Belamy et 
al., 2005) and for specific field sites (Bradley et al., 2005) providing an indicative reference mode of 
behaviour for a quantified measure of soil degradation in England. Figure 4a shows the national trends 
in SOC for grassland and arable land, and Figure 4b illustrates the trend for a particular 1km grid square 
centred on the Hoosfield experimental site at Rothamsted, near Harpenden, England. This data was 
used an indicative reference mode of behaviour for the issue of soil degradation. 
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3.1.2 Core model of biophysical processes 
 
At a simplified level, SOC can be considered a single soil stock governed by organic matter inflows and 
decomposition outflows (Gerber, 2016) whereby carbon is either further recycled within the soil or 
lost from the soil as carbon dioxide emissions (Coleman & Jenkinson 1996). At a more detailed level, 
SOC can be considered to exist in a number of different carbon “pools”, sub-stocks of the total SOC 
stock, each with separate inflows and outflows governed by different parameters and changing on 
different timescales (Jenkinson et al., 1990). Various qualitative conceptual models exist which 
distinguish these and illustrate their relationships, complimented by a range of validated quantitative 
simulation models. The models are used to help explore the dynamic consequences of these 
structures to support of land management decisions, scientific enquiry and public policy design. In 
order to improve model building efficiency and model validity, existing SOC models listed on the ISMC 
(2019) database were reviewed to determine which components could be replicated to support this 
thesis. The criteria used to determine whether all or part of a model structure could be used were that 
the model should be: 
• Able to simulate SOC dynamics; 
• Formally validated and referenced in published scientific articles; 
• Freely available through open access or academic license; 
• Fully documented such that model can be reproduced according to minimum documentation 
standards of Rahmandad & Sterman (2012); 
• Adaptable to English environmental conditions; 
• Adaptable at different geographical and temporal scales. 
RothC-26.3 is a simulation model of SOC turnover which calculates total SOC and sub-stocks plant 
matter carbon, microbial biomass carbon, and humus carbon in Mg C ha-1 at timescales defined by the 
user, requiring a small number of easily obtainable inputs (Coleman & Jenkinson, 1996). RothC-26.3 
has been validated using historic data for the Hoosfield barley experiment sites at Rothamsted 
Research Centre (Coleman & Jenkinson, 2014), conforms to empirical measurements in recent 
scientific studies (e.g. Herbst et al., 2018), has been applied in government commissioned research 
(e.g. Bhogal et al., 2010) and has been used as the basis of other soil simulation models developed for 
different purposes (e.g. the ECOSS model (Smith et al., 2010)). RothC-26.3 meets all of the above 
criteria including geographical scale adaptability, and here as in other applications is used in this 
research at individual plot or field scale. The entire RothC-26.3 structure (variables, causal 
relationships and equations) was therefore selected for use by this study. 
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To enable the RothC-26.3 structure to include new elements as a prototype natural capital investment 
appraisal tool for the purposes of this thesis, RothC-26.3 was replicated from the model 
documentation by Coleman & Jenkinson (2014) to build a stock and flow structure in the Stella 
Architect software (isee Systems, 2019). As part of this translation process, RothC-26.3’s discrete 
system of sums of exponentials was converted to a first-order differential equation system with 
reference to Parshotam (1996). This structure was used as the core model adapted and added to for 
the purposes of this thesis. Other available simulation models could have been used, but many of 
these did not satisfy the documentation criteria that would enable their replication. Structures from 
other models could be used in future work building on this thesis should their replication be permitted. 
The structure for the RothC-26.3 core model is illustrated in Figure 5. This shows that SOC is present 
in four stocks: decomposable plant material (DPM), resistant plant material (RPM), microbial biomass 
(BIO) and humified organic matter (HUM). The carbon present in organic material within each stock 
decays to produce either more BIO and HUM, or is lost from the soil through carbon emissions. The 
proportion that decays depends on the “Rate modifying factors” (“Topsoil moisture deficit”, 
“Temperature” and “Soil cover”) within the decay time period converted from the decomposition rate 
constants for that stock. In this way, carbon enters the soil system, is recycled through the different 
stocks, and is eventually lost to the atmosphere. The variable “SOC per area” sums all of the stocks to 
give an overall value of SOC in MgC ha-1. Carbon enters the soil through decomposing plant residues 
(“Mean annual input of carbon from plant residues”) and organic amendments such as farmyard 
manure (FYM) (“Mean annual input of carbon from FYM or other organic amendment”). 
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Figure 5: Stock and flow structure of RothC-26.3 replicated in Stella Architect as a system dynamics model (attached file name “RothC_Stella rebuild_04”). Adapted based 
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In the RothC-26.3 model documentation (Coleman & Jenkinson, 2014), the model developers provide 
a simulation model run comparison against historical SOC data collected from three experimental 
treatment plots at the Hoosfield barley experimental site near Harpenden, England. To confirm the 
RothC-26.3 structure had been accurately translated into a stock and flow structure in Stella Architect, 
the replicated model was simulated and the outputs compared with the original RothC-26.3 results 
presented in the model documentation. Partial model tests (Homer, 2012) were then performed 
according to the behaviour pattern validation sequence outlined by Barlas (1996). Figure 6a  shows 
the RothC-26.3 documentation run comparison against the historical SOC data for the Hoosfield sites 
subjected to different organic matter treatment regimes. Figure 6b shows the results of the translated 
SD version which is the biophysical core of the model developed in this thesis. The replicated version 
of the model can be seen to reproduce a smoothed version of the RothC-26.3 output of Figure 6a for 
all three experimental treatments. This is because the replicated version used annual average input 
data for precipitation, evapotranspiration, plant residue additions and FYM applications rather than 
the monthly data used in the original model. This level of detail was considered sufficient for checking 
that the structure of RothC-26.3 had been replicated accurately. 
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3.2 Ecosystem services 
 
Ecosystem services are the benefits society receives from natural capital (MEA, 2005). Dominati et al. 
(2010) present a framework illustrating how the ecosystem services provided by soils are linked to soil 
properties. Janes-Basset & Davies (2018) propose “natural capital pathways” to illustrate how changes 
in drivers and supporting processes can affect specific soil properties and in turn lead to changes in 
specific ecosystem services, such as food production and climate regulation. Graves et al. (2015) 
distinguish between the costs of declines in ecosystem services due to soil degradation in England and 
Wales for “on-site” and “off-site” beneficiaries of those services. In the case of SOC loss, on-site costs 
due to decline in crop production (provisioning ecosystem service) borne by land managers was 
calculated at £3.5 billion per year, compared to the much larger off-site costs of climate change 
consequences of greenhouse gas release (climate regulation service) borne by society of £566.1 billion 
per year. Given the importance of different ecosystem services between on-site and off-site actors 
and the magnitude of the cost differences involved, it was decided that this distinction between on-
site and off-site ecosystem services benefits and financial consequences would be reflected in further 
model development. This was also thought important given the potential for different feedback 
mechanisms by which on-site (farmers) and off-site beneficiaries might respond to financial incentives 
through changes in ecosystem services mediated by SOC (Graves et al., 2015). 
 
3.2.1 On-site ecosystem services 
 
On plots of land containing soil, changes in soil organic matter influence crop yields (ecosystem service 
of food and fibre provision) (Pan et al., 2009), as well as soil compaction (Yang et al., 2014) and release 
of plant nutrients (Bhogal et al., 2010). Investments by farmers targeted at increasing their soil organic 
matter stocks (of which SOC is a measure) reported in a series of case studies by KeySoil (2010) confirm 
that raising soil organic matter levels improved yields, reduced soil compaction and meant that less 
inorganic fertiliser needed to be applied. KeySoil (2010) is a key reference used by Graves et al. (2015) 
in their economic analysis of soil degradation. Because the influence of SOC on these variables was 
not included in the original RothC-26.3 model and nor could they be identified from the model 
documentation of other models reviewed from the ISMC (2019) database, an attempt was made to 
operationalise these relationships by expanding on the replicated core model structure based on 
available scientific literature and secondary data. 
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SOC is correlated with both total crop production output and with crop yield variability (Pan et al., 
2009). This is how SOC relates to food and fibre production as a provisioning ecosystem service. It has 
been proposed that SOC influences crop yield in these ways through the role of soil organic matter (of 
which SOC is a measure) in determining a soil’s water holding capacity (Williams et al., 2016). This is 
corroborated by organic matter investment case reports where farmers observed improved water 
retention in previously droughty soils and reduced crop yield variability following improvements of 
soil organic matter levels (KeySoil, 2010). However, a meta-analysis of 60 published studies by 
Minasny & McBratney (2018) concluded that the effect of increasing SOC on soil water capacity was 
negligible and of little practical significance, raising questions for earlier model formulations of the 
influence of SOC on crop yield via soil water (e.g. Gerber, 2016), and posing challenges for how the 
food production ecosystem service should be understood and modelled for the purposes of this 
research. The issue is complicated further since soil organic matter also influences crop yield through 
release of plant nutrients (Brady & Weil, 2016). To resolve these points, a proposed structure was 
developed for the model which distinguishes the influence of SOC on regulating crop yield variability 
and the release of plant nutrients from decaying soil organic matter. 
The influence of SOC on crop yield variability was modelled as a multiplier effect on the “Maximum 
potential harvested yield”. The variable was parameterised for barley which is the crop grown on the 
Hoosfield experimental sites near Rothamsted, England, that the RothC-26.3 model was validated 
against above. This was set at 7 Mg ha-1 which is the highest per hectare yield value in a five-year 
averaging period for the whole UK 2013-2017 (Defra, 2018b). The variable “Actual harvestable crop 
yield” multiplies the “Maximum potential harvested yield” by the “Drought effect on yield given SOM 
status”, which is the proportion of the maximum yield which is lost in a drought year. This is governed 
by the variable “SOM influence on mean yield variability” which calculates the yield variability 
(proportion of total yield at risk of loss during drought) based on the SOC stock calculated by the 
RothC-26.3 part of the core model. This “SOM influence on mean yield variability” uses a linear 
equation function reported in Pan et al. (2009) for intensive cereal production systems in China with 
a temperate climate. This is the available data representing this relationship which is most similar to 
a barley field in England. Through comparison with the “Initial SOM influence on mean yield 
variability”, the “Yield protected by SOM” is calculated based on the “Drought probability” and 
“Maximum potential harvested yield”. The “Yield protected by SOM” represents the loss of yield due 
to drought which is avoided through the resilience provided by the SOC natural capital stock, indicating 
the contribution of this variable to the food and fibre production ecosystem service. A “SWITCH” 
variable is included so the model can be set to include droughts occurring at a frequency defined by 
the user with base setting at 5-year intervals as reported in KeySoil (2010). “Crop plant residue 
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production” is calculated from the “Actual harvestable crop yield” using the “Crop plant residue 
Harvest Index” parameterised for barley (McCartney et al., 2006). This then determines the quantity 
of crop plant residues which are available, thus introducing a capacity constraint on the amount of 
plant residues that can be used as an input to the RothC-26.3 core model component. This introduces 
a feedback loop, assuming that plant residues can only be sourced on-site and not imported. The 
structure is illustrated in the upper part of Figure 7. The influence of SOC on total yield was not 
modelled since changes in yield reported in case studies KeySoil (2010) were much more significant 
for yield variability and this was assumed to be resulting from improved soil moisture status. 
 






Plant nutrients are released from decaying organic matter (Brady & Weil, 2016). In organic farming 
systems, organic amendments and crop residues are the only source of additional nutrients whereas 
in conventional farming systems, farmers can choose to use both organic and inorganic fertilisers 
(Watson et al., 2006). In this way, nutrients can originate from natural capital (organic matter) and 
manufactured capital (inorganic fertiliser). In case studies where farmers began investing in increasing 
their soil natural capital stocks of organic matter, farmers reported they were able to reduce their 
applications of inorganic fertiliser for the macronutrients nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P) and potassium 
(K) (KeySoil, 2010). The release of NPK from decaying organic matter according to this process was 
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represented in the model using the decay outflows from the various RothC-26.3 stocks in the core 
model. In the case of P and K, these nutrients were released from PM originating from FYM based on 
reported P and K contents of FYM (Bhogal et al., 2010). N was modelled as being released from all SOC 
stocks depending on the C:N ratio (carbon to nitrogen ratio) of the organic matter in those pools. In 
this way a proposed structure was developed for operationalising the role of organic matter in nutrient 
release as a natural capital alternative to the manufactured capital of inorganic fertilisers. The 
structure is illustrated in the lower part of Figure 7. 
Soil bulk density (BD) is the ratio of soil mass to its total volume and is used as an indicator of soil 
compaction (Al-Shammary et al., 2018). This measure is also commonly referred to as a soil health 
indicator because compaction has significant implications for crop productivity and erosion risk (Huber 
et al., 2008; Obade et al., 2016). Cases documenting the results of farmer investment in soil organic 
matter reported reduced soil compaction and greater tillage efficiency (KeySoil, 2010). A proposed 
structure for representing the contribution of SOC to compaction reduction was therefore added to 
the model. “Soil Bulk Density” was added as a stock controlled by the inflow of “Soil compaction” and 
the outflow of “Soil decompaction”. Soil compaction was driven by an exogenous variable of “Soil 
compacting land use activities” which assumes a constant rate of soil compaction caused by 
agricultural activities. Soil decompaction was represented as governed by two processes: 
decompaction by the farmer through tillage (“Decompaction effort by farmer”) and the soil’s natural 
resistance to compaction determined by the SOC stock (“Soil compaction regulation by SOM”). This 
enabled the farmer’s decompaction effort to be dynamic: the greater the contribution of organic 
matter to decompaction the lower their decompaction effort (tillage intensity) would need to be, and 
vice versa. The “Soil compaction regulation by SOM” was calculated based on the difference between 
the Soil Bulk Density stock value and a “SOM bulk density predictor”. This predictor variable uses a 
regression equation from Yang et al. (2014) where BD can be predicted on the basis of soil organic 
matter concentrations in an unmanaged Alpine landscape. This variable therefore represents what a 
soil’s BD “could be” under less intensively managed conditions. To make this calculation, the SOC 
output from the RothC-26.3 core model was converted to units of SOM g kg-1. To make this conversion 
a BD is required, therefore the mathematical influence of BD on SOC was included so that changes in 
BD were reflected in the SOC conversion variable used in the “SOM bulk density predictor”. This 
adjustment accords with other scientific work (e.g. Bhogal et al. , 2010). The structure is illustrated in 
the lower part of Figure 8. 
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3.2.2 Off-site ecosystem services 
 
Of the off-site costs of soil degradation in England and Wales, Graves et al. (2015) identified the most 
significant of these was the net release of carbon dioxide due to the net loss of SOC from degrading 
soil organic matter. Because carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas, this loss represents a decline in the 
delivery of climate regulation as a regulating ecosystem service by soils. The release of carbon from 
SOC during decay is calculated on a per hectare basis by the replicated RothC-26.3 core model. The 
“Net C sequestration by soil” variable was added as an indicator of the soil natural capital stock’s 
climate regulation ecosystem service. This was calculated from the variables of the RothC-26.3 core 
model by subtracting “C emissions” from the “Total organic C inputs”. 
Another important off-site cost of soil degradation calculated by Graves et al. (2015) was the removal 
of sediment (eroded soil) from rivers and canals, drainage systems and drinking water. This 
corresponds to the regulating ecosystem services of drinking water quality and flood protection an 
otherwise healthy soil would provide. The Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) is widely used to 
calculate soil loss (Renard et al., 1997) such including spatial ecosystem services models (Natural 
Capital Project, 2019). The factors used to calculate the USLE are Rainfall Erosivity (R), Slope Length 
(LS), a Crop Management Factor (C), a Support Practice Factor (P), and a Soil Erodibility Factor (K) 
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which indicates the susceptibility of soil particles to detachment and transport by rainfall and runoff 
(Renard et al., 1997). K can be calculated based on soil texture (M), soil structure (b), soil profile 
permeability (c) and SOM content (a). Loss of SOM (as indicated by SOC) is therefore result in erosion 
and soil degradation (Lal, 2001). A structure was added to the model enabling the USLE to be 
calculated with a dynamic K factor while keeping the other USLE factors constant. The dynamic K factor 
was formulated in the additional structure to be calculated based on the dynamic “a” component 
determined by the SOC stock value generated by the RothC26.3 core model. 
The structure used to calculate the “USLE” and “Net C sequestration by soil” is illustrated in Figure 9. 
A low and/or declining USLE indicates a poor and/or reduction in a soil’s flood and water quality 
regulatory ecosystem services. A negative and/or declining “Net C sequestration” indicates the soil is 
a net emitter of carbon or that its ability to sequester more carbon is reducing, representing a loss or 
reduction in the soil’s climate regulation ecosystem service. 
 
Figure 9: Model structures representing soil’s climate regulating and water quality and flood 
protection (via sediment retention) regulating ecosystem services. 
 
 
Although soils provide a huge range of other ecosystem services (Dominati et al., 2010) not 
represented by the model, ecosystem services reported as being most significant in the relevant 
documentary evidence were prioritised for inclusion. Other ecosystem services and the dynamic 
relationships between them could be added in future adaptations for other uses of the model. 
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3.3 Economic benefits and costs 
 
3.3.1 On-site benefits and costs 
 
The model proposes a structure for operationalising the contribution of SOC as a natural capital stock 
to the provisioning ecosystem service of food production through its influence on yield variability, 
contribution to plant nutrient cycling and regulation of soil compaction. These contributions generate 
benefits for on-site actors, namely farmers and other land managers, who receive income for their 
produce and who spend money purchasing fertiliser and conducting cultivation activities (tillage) 
towards this. A structure for calculating an indicative monetary value for these benefits and the costs 
to the farmer for investing in them was added to the model. Structures to determine the marginal net 
benefit of investing in SOM on a per hectare basis was also including thus providing the means to 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) for the lad manager. The factors added correspond to those used 
in the CBA’s of KeySoil (2010) for calculating the economic benefit to farmers of investing in SOM. 
To calculate the “Drought resilience value of SOM for yield income protection”, “Yield protected by 
SOM” is multiplied by “Price per crop ton”. Here the price for barley is used, corresponding to the crop 
grown on the experimental plots at Hoosfield, Rothamsted, and the other model parameter settings. 
To calculate the value of nutrients released from SOM during decay, the quantity of NPK released is 
compared to the national mean application rate of each nutrient in inorganic fertiliser for cereals 
(Defra, 2018c), representing a potential cost saving for that nutrient. The value of “Cost saving on 
compaction relief cultivation due to [the] influence of SOM” is calculated based on the potential 
avoided fuel costs that could be made based on the “Effect of SOM compaction regulation on 
cultivation efficiency”. These benefit values are summed in the variable “Annual onsite benefits of 
SOM per area”. All of these variables and their relationships in the model are shown in the structure 
illustrated in Figure 10. 
Costs to farmers associated with investment in SOM included in the economic assessments of KeySoil 
(2010) include the costs of purchasing FYM or other organic amendments if they are unavailable on 
the farm, costs of handling and spreading FYM to land, costs of additional slug and weed management, 
and costs related to ploughing in of crop plant residues. A particularly important variable highlighted 
in these cases was the income foregone from selling plant residues, namely cereals straw. This 
“Potential income foregone from plant residue sales” was calculated by subtracting the “Actual 
income from plant residue sales by area” from the “Potential income from plan residue sales by area” 
based on the “Price per Mg of plant residue”. This was reported an important variable for the 
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sensitivity of the economic assessments by KeySoil (2010). The “Potential income foregone from plant 
residue sales” was summed with the other costs to calculate the “Additional annual onsite cost for 
investing in SOM per area”, as shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 10: Structure for calculating the on-site benefits of soil ecosystem services. 
 
 
Figure 11: Structure for calculating the costs to the land manager of increasing SOC stocks. 
 
 
The “Additional annual onsite cost for investing in SOM per area” was subtracted from the “Annual 
onsite benefits of SOM per area” to calculate the “Farmer net benefit of OM per hectare”. This was 
represented as a net flow controlling the stock “Farmer CB balance for investing in OM” to track the 
accumulated balance of on-site OM benefits and costs over time. The “Farmer net benefit of OM per 
hectare” was controlled by the switch “Farmer Decision to make CBA”, reflecting whether or not the 
economic value of OM was being recognised in the decision-making processes of agricultural 
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businesses. Since this stock was used to inform decision making elsewhere in the model, this control 
enabled the model to reflect the assumption that if the benefits and costs of investing are not being 
accounted for by a land manager, they cannot affect decisions about land management practices. 
 
3.3.2 Off-site benefits and costs 
 
Further structures were added in the model for calculating the value of “external” costs and benefits 
of ecosystem services generated for off-site actors. 
The economic value of the “Net C sequestration by soil” can be considered as the soil’s net 
contribution to the climate change burden borne by society, or soil’s potential for providing the 
climate regulation ecosystem service. Following Graves et al. (2015), this is calculated based on the 
marginal abatement cost (MAC) of reducing emissions, which the UK Government considers to reflect 
its long-term policy commitments greenhouse gas emissions reduction (DECC, 2009). In the model, 
this is used as the “CO2 price” which is multiplied by the variable “Net C sequestration by soil” and a 
“Conversion to measure cost of C rather than CO2” to calculate the “Annual value of net CO2 
sequestration in soil by area”. This drives a net flow controlling the “Accumulated net CO2 seq value” 
to determine the accumulated value of climate regulation over the course of the model simulation. 
Negative values imply soil is failing to provide a climate regulation service because it is losing SOC and 
leading to net emissions. Positive values imply soils are providing this ecosystem service. Whether this 
is increasing or decreasing indicates whether this ecosystem service is improving or declining. The 
structure is shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: Structure for calculating the value of soil’s climate regulation ecosystem service. 
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The economic value of soil’s contribution to flood regulation and drinking water quality regulation was 
determined based on the cost of removing sediment used by Graves et al. (2015) based on Anthony 
et al. (2009). This cost can be considered as an indication of the expenses borne by drinking water 
companies for removing sediment from drinking water sources and by local authorities for the 
clearance of public drainage systems. These are off-site costs because they are borne by these actors 
away from the site of soil degradation and ultimately are borne by drinking water customers and 
taxpayers. The “Cost of nuisance sediment per source ha” is calculated by multiplying the USLE by the 
“Cost per ton of nuisance removal” and by the “Proportion of sediment deposited in unwanted 
locations”. This latter variable determines how much of the eroded soil from a source hectare is 
eventually deposited in a location requiring removal by the example actors mentioned above (base 
setting at 1 i.e. 100%). The “Accumulated value of change in nuisance sediment removal per ha” for 
the duration of the simulation is based on the “Change in cost of nuisance sediment removal during 
simulation” which is the difference between in the “Initial Cost of nuisance sediment per source ha” 
and the “Cost of nuisance sediment per source ha” to provide a marginal indication of gain or loss in 
erosion prevention value relative to the starting conditions at the beginning of a simulation run. The 
“Water quality and flood regulation value” is an indicator equal to the stock (Figure 11). 
 




3.4 Soil management decisions influence over biophysical processes 
 
Soil organic matter (as represented by SOC) is a manageable soil factor identified by Dominati et al. 
(2010). Land managers can increase SOC in a number of ways, such as by adding an organic 
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amendment like FYM or compost, through the use of crop rotations with incorporation of plant 
residues, and through reductions in the number and intensity of tillage practices (Johnston et al., 
2009). The original RothC-26.3 model enables the exploration of the quantities and timings of organic 
materials applications as well as the incorporation of plant residues on a per hectare basis, with each 
model run representing a particular plot or field as a homogenous land management unit (Coleman & 
Jenkinson, 1996). This functionality was included as part of the replicated RothC-26.3 core model 
where the RothC input variables “Mean annual input of carbon from plant residues” and “Mean 
annual input of carbon from FYM or other organic amendment” are determined by the “Mean annual 
input of plant residues” and the “Mean annual input of FYM or other organic amendment” 
respectively, as well as their respective carbon fractions (proportion of their biomass which is carbon). 
The use of crop rotations can be included in the model using different parameter configurations: for 
example, the variables “Maximum potential harvested yield” and “Crop plant residue Harvest Index” 
could be set to rotate annually using different values for the relevant crops, and the linear equation 
controlling the variable “SOM influence on mean yield variability” (currently set for cereals) changed 
accordingly. These variables were parameterised for barley corresponding with the rest of the model. 
The RothC26.3 model does not include functionality to explore alternative cultivation (tillage) 
practices. Tillage is said to influence SOC by increasing the rate of organic matter decomposition and 
promoting SOC mineralisation (Powlson et al., 2011). Reduced tillage is often recommended as a 
technique for improving soil quality and storing more carbon in the soil as SOC (Minasny et al. 2017). 
Such activities could be explored in the model with tillage included as a “Rate modifying factor” 
controlling the decay rates (outflows) of the four SOC stocks. However, despite case studies supporting 
the idea that reduced tillage can lead to soil improvement and beneficial economic outcomes for 
farmers (KeySoil, 2010), Chenu et al. (2019) explains that the scientific evidence remains inconclusive 
and highlights future research needs to help resolve the controversy. Others have also criticised 
advocating reduced tillage for the purpose of increasing SOC in the UK because “There is a very limited 
number of publications giving results on the impact of reduced or zero tillage on soil C under the 
temperate humid climatic conditions of the UK or nearby regions of northwest Europe, as opposed to 
a large body of data from regions of continental climate in North America or tropical and sub-tropical 
regions in South America and elsewhere." (Powlson et al., 2011, p. 25). Although structures were 
added to the model to explore the reported benefit of increasing SOC for improving cultivation 
efficiency (see sections on-site ecosystem services and on-site costs and benefits), structures relating 
to cultivation effects on SOC mineralisation were not added to the model in recognition of the 
scientific uncertainty and relevance to the regional context being studied. 
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Structures were added to the model to representing land managers’ decision-making process of 
whether to incorporate their crop residues or to sell them (“DECISION To return plant residue to field 
or to sell”), and whether or not to add an organic amendment such as FYM (“DECISION Add FYM or 
other organic amendment”). The former controls the variables “Mean annual input of plant residues” 
and “Harvested plant residue”, while the latter controls the variable “Mean annual input of FYM or 
other organic amendment”. Both “DECISION” variables are determined by “DECISION To invest in 
OM”. The “DECISION To invest in OM” is (in the absence of a policy intervention) influenced by 
“Standard practice to invest in OM” which is determined by “DECISION To keep investing in OM”. This 
is determined by the stock “Farmer CB [cost benefit] balance for investing in OM” which is controlled 
by the flow “Farmer Net benefit of OM per hectare”. This subtracts the “Additional annual onsite cost 
for investing in SOM per area” from the “Annual onsite benefits of SOM per area” already mentioned 
in the section about on-site benefits. This flow calculation is only active (switched on and making the 
calculation) if “Decision to make CBA switch” is 1, based on the stock “Farmer making a CBA”. 
The whole structure reflects an assumption underlying farmer education policies: the premise that if 
the farmer makes a cost benefit analysis of the economic costs and benefits of SOM investment, and 
those investments can be expected to yield a net benefit within a reasonable time frame (here 5 years) 
(equation for “DECISION To keep investing in OM” is “(IF(FORCST(CB_balance_for_investing_in_OM, 
1, 5)> 0) THEN 1 ELSE 0”), it will be “Standard practice [for the farmer] to invest in OM”, leading to 
their “DECISION To invest in OM”. However, if the farmer is not making the cost benefit analysis, or 
the farmer’s forecast for “Farmer CB balance for investing in OM” is negative based on existing 
information available to them, they will take not choose the “DECISION To keep investing in OM” and 
therefore won’t return plant residues or add an organic amendment. Such an assumption has support 
based on the KeySoil (2010) cases where farmers were inspired to continue investing in organic matter 
once they were aware of the economic benefits they received as a result. This structure nevertheless 
only represents a part of the farmer decision-making process for on the land management practices 
they use. These can be based on but are not limited to a range of socioeconomic factors (Boardman 
et al., 2017). The decision process represented in this model is based on detailed case studies 
specifically focused on organic matter management corresponding to the purpose of this model. 
 
3.5 Model overview: feedback loops 
 
Figure 3 presents a schematic of the model sectors. As shown, SOC is driven by a combination of land 
management decisions (whether to add an organic amendment or crop residues to the soil) and onsite 
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ecosystem services (the quantity of crop residues available is driven by food and fibre production). 
The onsite ecosystem services are themselves determined by SOC, thus indicating a feedback 
mechanism. The land management decisions taken to manage SOC can be informed by the onsite 
ecosystem services benefits and costs of investing in SOC if the land manager is making a cost benefit 
analysis and recognising the importance of SOC in their financial assessments. Historically this 
feedback is assumed to have been inactive, hence the need for the economic assessments recorded 
by KeySoil (2010). If farmers are unaware of these benefits their land management decisions will not 
be informed by them. The red arrow represents this conditional relationship. If present, this would 
indicate a second feedback mechanism. The offsite ecosystem services delivered by SOC and the 
associated costs and benefits are not connected to the land management decision structures and are 
thus represented in the model as “externalities” reflecting Graves et al. (2015). 
The CLD in Figure 12 distinguishes the feedback mechanisms in the model as individual reinforcing (R) 
or balancing (B) feedback loops. The variables depicted are simplified aggregations used to distil the 
essence of the operational SFD structure of the simulation model. As shown, there are three 
“biophysical” feedback loops (black) and four inactive “decision” feedback loops (red). R1 represents 
how increases in SOC can improve drought resilience leading to higher crop biomass production and 
more available crop residues, a proportion of which are unavoidably added to the soil because they 
are irrecoverable by the farmer, increasing the SOC stock further. R2 reflects the same process for 
crop residues which are recoverable by the farmer who decides whether to sell them (e.g. as straw) 
or to add more organic matter to the soil. B1 represents the balancing feedback loop whereby higher 
SOC stocks increase the rate of mineralisation (with more organic matter there is more organic matter 
decaying per unit of time) which depletes the SOC stock. The inactive decision loop R3 shows how 
increases in SOC reduce the soil bulk density which, because of the positive relationship, would reduce 
the cultivation effort the farmer needs to relieve soil compaction. The cultivation effort is then 
accounted for in farmers’ business finances (e.g. based on fuel costs, as in the model). The inactive 
decision loop R4 shows how higher SOC stocks and improve drought resilience provides yield 
protection which has a financial value. The inactive decision loop R5 shows how higher SOC stocks 
lead to higher mineralisation of organic matter and release plant nutrients which reduce farmers’ need 
for expenditure on inorganic fertilizers. The inactive decision loop B2 shows how if the farmer 
increases the amount of organic matter added to the soil, it will increase their expenses, such as on 
handling or importing FYM, and reduce the income they receive from plant residue sales. All of these 
loops are inactive because they are not accounted for in a cost benefit ratio of investing in organic 
matter and used to support land manager decisions on whether to improve soil organic matter levels. 
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The influence of SOC on the external costs of eroded sediment removal (water quality and flood 
regulation) and costs to society of climate change (climate regulation) are not part of a feedback loop. 
 
Figure 12: CLD showing the feedback loops in the model. 
 
 
3.6 Basic settings 
 
The global settings of the simulation model defined in the modelling software may be changed for the 
purposes of validation testing, policy design or use of the model for other purposes beyond this thesis. 
The basic settings used in this thesis were: 
• Start time: 1852 (first year with RothC-26.3 data for the Hoosfield plots (Coleman & Jenkinson, 
2014) for comparison with historical data, or 2020 (roughly the “present day”) for policy tests; 
• Stop time: 2020 (roughly the “present day”) for comparison with historical data, or 2030 
(Defra target year for sustainable soil management (HM Government, 2018)); 
• Time units: years; 
• Delta Time (DT): 1/365 (i.e. provides a daily timestep); 
• Integration method: Euler. 
The model is fully documented according to the guidelines of Rahmandad & Sterman (2012) in the 
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Chapter 4. Model Analysis 
 
4.1 Model behaviour 
 
The model parameters were adjusted to reproduce the RothC-26.3 simulation results for SOC on the 
“Unmanured” Hoosfield treatment plot at Rothamsted and were extended to the year 2020 (roughly 
the “present day”). This was considered to represent a “Base Case” of declining SOC stocks which 
mirrored the historical trend of SOC decline in England and Wales on arable sites at a national level. 
The model parameters were also adjusted to reproduce the RothC-26.3 simulation results for SOC on 
the “Manured annually” Hoosfield treatment plot for the same time period. This was considered to 
represent a “Best Case” in which SOC stocks had been increasing historically on the plot contrary to 
the national trend. Additionally, model parameters were adjusted to produce a “Worst Case” with a 
more rapidly declining SOC trend than at the Hoosfield unmanured plot. These simulation results and 
the model settings required to produce them were compared with each other and those of an 
“Equilibrium” (no change) simulation run to investigate which model structures were responsible for 
the resulting behaviour. Simulation results for SOC in Mg ha-1 and % carbon (w/w of soil) are shown in 
Figures 13a and 13b respectively. 
 
Figure 13a: Base, Best and Worst Case model 
runs for SOC (units Mg ha-1). 
Figure 13b: Base, Best and Worst Case model 
runs for SOC (units % carbon w/w). 
  
 
Jonathan D. Nichols / 263851 and s1030015 / European Master in System Dynamics / Master’s Thesis Page 42 
 
Table 2 shows which model settings were altered to produce the behaviour for each Case. As shown, 
the Base Case results could only be generated assuming a maximum and constant barley yield of 7 Mg 
ha-1 (which is the national maximum for the years 2013-2017) and assuming that even when the land 
manager decides not to invest intentionally in SOC, 28.5% of recoverable crop residues are still 
returned to the field. This differs from the historical barley yields at Hoosfield which vary over time 
and on average were much lower, while the proportion of crop residues generated on the plot which 
were incorporated into the soil is not reported (Rothamsted Research, 2012). The Equilibrium results 
were generated using the same settings, but using an unrealistically high maximum yield of 8.34 Mg 
ha-1 to enable 1.6 Mg of carbon to be added per hectare per year from plant residues as in the Base 
Case. Using the same settings as the Base Case, the Best Case could only be generated by introducing 
an exogenous reason to invest in SOM i.e. a decision to increase SOC levels not determined 
endogenously by the model structure. At the Hoosfield site, this was because of the motivation to 
conduct a scientific experiment. Beyond Hoosfield, other motivations could be farmers adopting 
organic production methods dependent on manures for nutrient inputs, or through existing policy 
instruments which are not based on actual or desired SOC levels. By comparison, the Worst Case 
results were generated with the same settings as the Base Case, except that the “Minimum proportion 
of recoverable plant residue being returned” was set equal to 0%. 
 
Table 2: Parameter settings used in the Equilibrium, Base, Best and Worst Case simulation runs. 







Maximum potential harvested yield for 
barley 
8.34 7 7 7 Mg ha-1 year-1 
SWITCH 
1 Exogenous reason to invest in SOM 
2 Dynamic reason to invest in SOM 
2 2 1 2 Dimensionless 
(switch) 
Minimum proportion of recoverable 
plant residue being returned 
0.285 0.285 0.285 0 Dimensionless 
(fraction) 
 
In the Base, Worse and Best Cases the SOC indicator variables exhibit goal-seeking behaviour (Figures 
13a and 13b), converging towards a new equilibrium beyond the year 2020 at a different level for each 
Case. The structural reason for this dynamic behaviour is that SOC is a sum of the four carbon stock 
levels as represented in the RothC-26.3 core model: RPM, DPM, BIO and HUM. The outflow of each of 
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these stocks is determined by the quantity of carbon in the stock (a first-order control as represented 
by balancing feedback loop B1 in Figure 12), the rate modifying factors (proportion of carbon in the 
stock being decayed) and the decomposition rate constant (residency time). These outflows add 
further carbon to the BIO and HUM stocks or are lost as carbon dioxide emissions. The long residency 
time of the HUM stock in particular (50 years) means that if the inflow of carbon, such as from plant 
residues and manures, is higher than the outflow of decay and set at a constant rate, carbon will 
accumulate in the stocks. However, it will accumulate at a decreasing rate over time, because a higher 
stock level increases the rate of decay when the rate modifying factors are fixed at a constant fraction 
as is the case here. Likewise, if the inflow of carbon is lower than the outflow of decay, the stock will 
begin to deplete. However, it will deplete at a decreasing rate over time, because a lower stock level 
decreases the rate of decay when the rate modifying factors are fixed at a constant fraction due to 
the balancing feedback loop B1. The Equilibrium run maintains SOC levels throughout the simulation 
time because the maximum yield has been set sufficiently high such that the inflow of carbon from 
crop residues matches the outflow of decaying organic matter. In dynamic terms, balancing loop B1 
dominates reinforcing loops R1 and R2. 
Looking beyond the RothC-26.3 core model sector, the origins of the simulated behaviour can be 
identified in the wider model structure. First, a comparison of the simulation results for each Case for 
the variable “Farmer CB balance for investing in OM” (Figure 14a) illustrates why an “exogenous 
reason” is required to increase SOC levels and that efforts to improve SOC may not arise endogenously 
through land managers’ decision structure represented in the model: the benefits and costs of 
investing in SOC are not being calculated or considered in land management decisions, and actions to 
increase SOC such as incorporation of plant residues or addition of FYM or another organic 
amendments are not being made with reference to the role of SOC in delivering on-site ecosystem 
services. This means that land managers don’t receive an information feedback from their financial 
decision making that result from changes in SOC following how they use plant residues and organic 
amendments. The unknown consequences of this are declining on-site ecosystem services and 
corresponding loss of unaccounted economic benefits for the land manager (Figure 14b), such as 
declining drought resilience value and reduction in cultivation efficiency, attributable to the loss of 
SOC in the Base and Worst Cases. By comparison, the economic benefits of the Best Case are also 
unaccounted for by the land manager. This is why even under these circumstances an exogenous (non-
dynamic) reason still is needed for the farmer to invest in OM throughout the simulation period. To 
the land manager who is unaware of the role of SOC in influencing the performance of their business, 
the Base, Best and Worst Cases appear to be financially the same as an “Equilibrium” simulation. 
Feedback loops R3, R4, R5 and B2 in Figure 12 do not operate. 
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Figure 14a: Farmer CB balance for investing in 
OM for the Base, Best and Worst Cases. 
Figure 14b: Value of ecosystem services benefits 
provided by SOC which are unrecognised by the 
land manager in the Base, Best and Worst Cases. 
  
 
The structural reason behind these results is that, in the modelled Cases, the land manager is initially 
unaware of the potential ecosystem services benefits of SOC and is not making a cost-benefit analysis 
based on this knowledge when the parameter “Initial making CBA” is set to zero. This means that their 
“Farmer CB balance for investing in OM” remains constant at zero and does not affect the farmers’ 
“DECISION To keep investing in OM” and thus it is not a “Standard practice to invest in OM”. The 
information feedback loop which influences the “DECISION To invest in OM” therefore does not 
operate throughout the simulation, and a farmer would only invest in OM with its unrealised costs 
and benefits attributable to changes in SOC if encouraged by a factor exogenous to the model. This 
corresponds to the assumption behind farmer advisory initiatives such as KeySoil (2010) which aim to 
assist farmers in making a CBA of investing in SOC, assuming that they are not already making a CBA 
and are therefore unaware of SOC’s role in onsite ecosystem services provision. 
A similar structural explanation can be proposed with reference to the simulation results for the 
variables “Water quality and flood regulation value” and “Climate regulation value” presented in 
Figures 15a and 15b respectively. These variables indicate the net value of SOC to water companies 
and local authorities who need to remove eroded soil sediment, and to civil society who expect to 
bear the costs of climate change impacts. Neither of these variables are connected to the decision-
making process of the land manager about whether to add more organic matter and are therefore 
externalities to the farmers’ business. This means that in the Base and Worst Cases, the decline in 
water quality, flood and climate regulation services do not influence the land manager’s decision to 
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alter their practices. Likewise, the increase in the value of SOC providing a climate regulation service 
and in avoiding sediment removal costs in the Best Case are not used to reward the land manager who 
instead requires an exogenous reason for investing in SOC in this simulation run. The absence of this 
feedback loop from changes in offsite ecosystem services to land managers is proposed by Graves et 
al. (2015) as representing an example of market and institutional failure and is proposed as a structural 
explanation for why soil degradation may have been occurring historically despite high offsite costs. 
Referring to Figure 12, it can be seen that no causal relationships connect these impacts with land 
managers’ decision processes 
 
Figure 15a: Change in economic value of the 
water quality and flood regulation ecosystem 
services for the Base, Best and Worst Cases. 
Figure 15b: Change in economic value of the 
climate regulation ecosystem services for the 




4.2 Validation testing 
 
Following guidelines and techniques described by Barlas (1996) and Sterman (2000), formal model 
analysis and validation procedures were performed throughout the iterative modelling process to 
continually build confidence in the model. Where relevant, partial model testing (Homer, 2012) was 
used to test and validate smaller model building blocks as documented in Chapter 3. The results of 
model validation procedures pertinent to the whole model are presented in this Chapter with three 
purposes: 
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1. Support an overall evaluation of the extent to which the model can be used with confidence 
to address the Research Questions; 
2. Inform a deeper interpretation of the model behaviour provided in 4.1 above; 
3. Highlight leverage points and challenges for natural capital investments in promoting desired 
system behaviour. 
Following Barlas (1996), three types of validation tests are reported: direct structure tests, structure-
oriented behaviour tests and behaviour pattern tests. Tests focused on assessing model structure 
were prioritised over tests focused on model behaviour to ensure “the right outputs are being 
generated for the right [structural] reasons” (Barlas, 1996, p.189). 
 
4.2.1 Direct structure tests 
 
Direct structure tests help assess the validity of a model’s structure by comparing it with existing 
knowledge about the “real” system (Barlas, 1996). The direct structure tests reported here include the 
structure verification test, parameter verification test, direct extreme-conditions test, boundary 
adequacy test, and the dimensional consistency test. 
The purpose of the structure verification test is to determine the extent to which a model’s structure 
conforms to existing knowledge about the structure of the “real” system (Barlas, 1996). This test can 
be conducted on an empirical basis through a comparison of the model equations with relationships 
that are known to exist in the real system (Forrester & Senge, 1980), and on a theoretical basis by 
comparing the model against generalised knowledge reported in relevant literature (Barlas, 1996) or 
through engagement with system operatives (Andersen et al., 2012; Forrester, 1992). As reported in 
Chapter 3, the model component representing the biophysical processes controlling SOC as a soil 
health and natural capital indicator was replicated and translated into a stock-and-flow structure from 
the well-established, widely-used and empirically validated RothC-26.3 model based on the model 
documentation (Coleman & Jenkinson, 1996). The forms of the equations were altered to translate 
RothC-26.3 into a system dynamics stock with reference to Parshotam (1996). This part of the model 
can therefore be considered to pass the structure verification test on an empirical basis. As reported 
in Chapter 3, the remainder of the model structure was constructed from a vast quantity of 
documentary evidence (secondary data) including peer-reviewed sources, Defra commissioned 
scientific reports and individual farm case studies. To do so, variables and relationships identified in 
the literature search were translated into a stock and flow structure according to the guidance of 
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Sterman (2000). Where uncertainties about system structure were reported in the literature, linear 
functions were used based on regression equations from peer-reviewed sources: for example, the 
controversy surrounding the extent to which SOC can influence crop yield variability through its effect 
on soil water holding capacity, and the decision to use the function reported in Pan et al. (2009). In 
some instances it was necessary to infer variables and relationships from secondary sources where 
these were not sufficiently explicit in the text: for example, the structure controlling the “Effect of 
SOM compaction regulation on cultivation efficiency” and resulting “Cost saving on compaction relief 
cultivation due to influence of SOM”. On a theoretical basis, the model can therefore be considered 
sufficiently valid given its strong grounding in published sources, while proposing some explicit 
formulations of implicit or hypothesised causal relationships. The latter presents the opportunity to 
further improve the model with research stakeholders beyond the completion of this thesis. 
The purpose of the parameter verification test is to determine whether each parameter (constant 
exogenous variable) corroborates with the known components of a “real” system (conceptual) and 
whether their values lie within plausible ranges (numerical) (Barlas, 1996). Based on Chapter 3 and 
the above discussion of structural validity, the corroboration between the model parameters and 
existing knowledge of the system can be considered sufficient to provide confidence of conceptual 
parameter validity. Regarding the numerical validity of parameter values, actual data was used where 
possible: for example, the MAC price of CO2 used in Graves et al. (2015). If such parameter data was 
unavailable, assumptions needed to be made using available information: for example, the “Maximum 
potential harvested yield” for barley was based on the 2017 figure reported in Defra (2018b). Other 
simplifying assumptions needed to be made about certain parameters to suit the model to a specific 
setting to ensure internal consistency. For this reason, the model was set up for a plot of land 
producing barley on a continuous cropping basis according to environmental conditions (e.g. soil type, 
climate) at the Hoosfield site near Harpenden. Where information was insufficient for well-grounded 
assumptions to be made, these were estimated experimentally by running simulations to explore 
which parameter values produced the most reasonable behaviours: for example, the value of the 
parameter “SOM time to BD rebound following disturbance” was set in this way by comparing the 
results of “Cost saving on compaction relief cultivation due to influence of SOM” with case studies 
reported by KeySoil (2010). Based on this discussion, confidence in numerical parameter validity can 
be concluded to be strongest where these were based on actual data, less strong where based on 
reasonably supported assumptions, and sufficiently strong when estimated through model 
experimentation. 
The purpose of the direct extreme-conditions test is to evaluate the response of the model to extreme 
settings of each model parameter against how the “real” system is known or can be expected to 
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respond (Forrester & Senge, 1980). Each parameter was altered in the model to have extremely low 
or extremely high values and the model software was consulted to see if computational errors would 
be generated. No errors were detected using these tests and the structure of the model can be 
considered sufficiently robust to extreme conditions. 
The purpose of the boundary adequacy test is to determine whether all structures necessary for 
fulfilling the purpose of the model are present (Sterman, 2000). In this study, the purpose of this model 
is to provide answers to the Research Questions listed in Chapter 1. This means that the functionality 
of the model must be sufficient for identification of the structural causes of soil degradation in England 
that relate to financial incentives (Objective 1) and explore opportunities and challenges for natural 
capital investment as an intervention to address them (Objective 2). Given the strong grounding of 
the model in documentary evidence spanning soil science, environmental economics, system 
dynamics and farmer decision making as discussed above and presented in Chapter 3, the model 
boundary can be considered sufficiency adequate for its purpose. One potential objection to this 
argument is the exclusion of explicit structures representing existing agricultural and environmental 
policy which is known to influence farmers’ decisions about the adoption of soil and water conserving 
practices via a variety of socioeconomic influences (Boardman et al., 2017). Such an argument is 
supported by the view that existing policy should be considered a part of a system’s structure 
(Sterman, 2000). Nevertheless, the purpose of the model was to seek endogenous causes of soil 
degradation and was the reason the system dynamics method was chosen (see Chapter 2 for methods 
choice). One of the criticisms of existing UK environmental and agricultural policy such as the Single 
Farm Payment is that financial incentives for achieving environmental goals are based on inputs and 
practices (“action oriented”) rather than outcomes (“results based”) (Burton & Schwartz, 2013). 
Existing UK policy that influences farmers’ management of SOM cannot be said to be based on 
achieving certain SOC levels or change trajectories, so considering this policy as an exogenous factor 
outside of the model boundary (such as through the “SWITCH 1 Exogenous reason to invest in SOM 2 
Dynamic reason to invest in SOM”) is supported and adheres to the purpose of the model. The 
potential also remains for the model to be adapted to serve the purpose of a policy evaluation tool 
for assessing the effectiveness of historic or existing policies. A second potential objection is that the 
model is focused on specific ecosystem services as influenced by SOC only and do not account for the 
broader potential impacts of management practices that aim to manage SOC, such as nitrogen 
leaching issues relating to FYM applications. Potential important exclusions are considered in the 
interpretation of model results and highlight areas for further refinement in potential future work. 
The purpose of the dimensional consistency test is to confirm the mathematically consistent use of 
units on both the left- and right-hand sides of model equations (Barlas, 1996). This was performed 
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using the modelling software with the “check units” function. In the case of this model, no unit errors 
were reported and thus confirm the overall dimensional consistency. The other component of this test 
is to check that units have “real world” equivalents such that no variables had been introduced with 
the purpose of “forcing” the model to function. As already discussed, sufficient structural validity was 
confirmed. A feature of this is that all variables have units with real world equivalents or are 
permissible as part of operational calculation steps. 
 
4.2.2 Structure Oriented Behaviour tests 
 
Structure-oriented behaviour tests help determine the validity of a model’s structure indirectly by 
assessing model-generated behaviour patterns using simulation to uncover potential structural flaws 
(Barlas, 1996). The structure-oriented behaviour tests reported here include the integration error test, 
qualitative features test, family member test and multiple mode test. 
The purpose of the integration error test is to determine whether model simulation results are 
sensitive to the choice of time step or numerical integration method used in the model settings 
(Sterman, 2000). To do this, results from the Base Case which were produced using the settings 
mentioned in section 3.6 were compared with simulations using half of the original timestep, and then 
with using the RK4 integration method instead of the original Euler method. No difference in model 
outputs were observed, confirming that the simulation results were not sensitive to alternative 
timesteps or integration methods within these ranges. 
The purpose of the qualitative features test is to assess whether the major qualitative behaviour 
patterns of simulated model variables correspond to actual data (reference modes) for those variables 
in the “real” system under specific conditions: in other words, to determine whether “the right output 
behaviour is being generated for the right reasons” (Barlas, 1996, p. 186). To perform this test the 
results of the Base Case, Worst Case, Base Case and Equilibrium simulation runs were compared with 
reference mode data for the central soil health indicator SOC (both Mg carbon ha-1 and % carbon w/w 
soil). As mentioned in section 4.1, SOC (Mg carbon ha-1) results for the Base and Best Cases matched 
to a sufficient degree of accuracy the RothC-26.3 output data from Coleman & Jenkinson (1996) for 
the unmanured and manured annually plots. In the original source these had been validated by 
empirical field data. In the expanded model described in Chapter 3, to produce these results (Figures 
13a and 13b) required the assumption that the “Minimum proportion of recoverable plant residue 
being returned” is 28.5% of “Recoverable crop plant residue based” and that the “Maximum potential 
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harvested yield” is 7 Mg ha-1. The behaviour pattern of SOC for the Worst Case also exhibits a goal-
seeking transient, but appears to stabilise at a lower equilibrium level to that of the Base Case. The 
direction of declining SOC (% carbon w/w) levels for the Base and Worst Cases correspond to declining 
SOC patterns recorded for aggregated arable sites in England and Wales between 1980 and 1995 
(Figure 4a), and to declining SOC levels from 1978 through 1998 to 2007 for the 1km grid square in 
which Hoosfield is located (Figure 4b). The shape of declining SOC levels for the Base and Worst Cases 
correspond to actual plot-scale data reported at Hoosfield (Figure 6a). The shape of SOC patterns over 
time for the national data is discrete, so it is only possible to compare their trajectory. The SOC values 
of the Base and Worst Case differ in absolute terms from the national and the 1km grid square 
estimates to a considerable extent (see Table 3). However, this is to be expected given the difference 
in spatial granularity of the datasets, since the model is being run at the individual plot-level 
representing highly specific conditions, whereas the national and 1km2 grid data present aggregate 
measures at much broader scales. For these reasons, the results of this test suggests that if the Base 
and Worst Cases are considered to represent English soils with particularly poor SOC status (i.e. indeed 
the “worst case”), the model structure could be considered sufficiently valid to the extent that it has 
the potential to provide SOC data corresponding to the “real system” in a certain configurations. This 
is because, according to the model settings for the Hoosfield unmanured plot, a continuous 
monoculture of barley is being grown without regular crop rotations contrary to modern agricultural 
practice in England (Powlson et al., 2011). Because of this, the results of this test suggest that “the 
right output behaviour is being generated for the right reasons” (Barlas, 1996, p. 186): even though 
the absolute numbers appear sensitive to parameter settings, these actually define local conditions, 
while the structure produces reasonable behaviour for such conditions. This test thus provides 
confidence in the validity of the model structure while also recommending parameter sensitivity tests 
be used to support the interpretation of results. Results of parameter sensitivity tests are reported in 
this Chapter. 
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Table 3: Comparison of reference and modelled data. 
Year Reference data Model 
 Eng arable 
(Rusco et 
al., 2001) 
Topsoil C conc. g/kg for 
Hoosfield 1km grid sq 
(Bradley et al., 2005) 
Base Worst Best 
1978 N.D. 2.476 1.11 0.89 3.23 
1980 3.3 N.D. 1.11 0.89 3.24 
1995 2.8 N.D. 1.11 0.88 3.33 
1998 N.D. 2.307 1.11 0.87 3.34 
2007 N.D. 2.143 1.10 0.86 3.39 
 
The purpose of the family member test is to determine whether the model structure is capable of 
generating behaviours observed in other instances of the same system (Sterman, 2000). As mentioned 
above, the model parameters were set to correspond to environmental (climate, soil type) and crop 
conditions (barley) at the Hoosfield site at Rothamsted to produce the Base, Best and Worst Case 
results. To perform the family member test, the model was run with a different set of parameter 
values designed to reflect a plot with a permanent grass (pasture) crop while under the same 
environmental conditions as the Hoosfield site. Table 4 reports which variables were reset for the run 
“Family member test (grass)” and the simulation results can be compared against the other runs as 
shown in Figure 16a and 16b. 
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Table 4: Comparison of parameter settings for the family member validation test. 
Variable Units Worst Case 
(barley crop) 




Mg ha-1 year-1 7 13 (Cotswold Grass Seeds Direct, 
2019) 




0.5 0.5 to return the same value as 
“Actual harvestable crop yield” 
because all the “Maximum 
potential harvested yield” accounts 
for all biomass as the plant residues 





0.6 0.6 (assumed the same as barley) 
“Carbon fraction 
of plant residues” 
Dimensionless 
(fraction) 
0.4 0.4 (FAO, 2019) 
Initial stock levels 
(1852) RPM, DPM, BIO 
and HUM 





Same as Base Case (Coleman & 
Jenkinson, 1996). 
“C Crop management 




0.1 0.004 (Morgan, 2005) 
“Plant residues CN 
ratio” 
Dimensionless 
(ratio to 1) 
80 20 (Planet Natural, 2019) 
“Price per Mg of plant 
residue” 
GBP Mg-1 6 38 (The Farming Forum, 2019a) 
“Price per crop ton” GBP Mg-1 190 38 because the plant residue is the 
crop (same as above) 
“Minimum proportion 





0 0 (same as Worst Case) 
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Figure 16a: Family member test results for SOC 
indicator (% carbon w/w soil). 
Figure 16b: Family test results for the potential 
(unaccounted for) cost benefit balance of 




The results of the family member test using settings for permanent grass crops indicate that SOC levels 
increase to converge at an equilibrium slightly higher than the Equilibrium run. This is because of the 
higher “Maximum potential harvested yield crop yield” which returns a higher quantity of 
“Unrecoverable plant residue” than barley in the Base and Worst Cases. Grass cover is reported to 
stabilise SOC at higher levels than arable crops (Chenu et al., 2019). These results therefore suggest 
that the model structure is capable of producing reasonable SOC behaviour for alternative cropping 
configurations at the same site. Looking at the potential cost benefit balance from changes in onsite 
ecosystem services, as reported in the variable “Unrecorded CB” of which the farmer is unaware and 
does not influence their management practices so far, it appears that this cropping choice could offer 
greater overall returns to the farmer than the Base or Worst Case because they can also sell all grass 
crop residues (silage) to receive an income. This is because of the higher “Price per Mg of plant 
residue” while maintaining and unknowingly benefiting from stable SOC levels. This highlights the 
sensitivity of the financial model outputs to the variable “Price per Mg of plant residue” for further 
analysis. This test also highlights the potential importance of crop choice, since this determines the 
ecosystem services value of SOC on a particular site. The structure of land managers’ decision process 
for crop choice (including rotations and different costs of managing specific types of crop) is not yet 
included in the modelled structure but could be a valuable addition in future work beyond this thesis. 
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The purpose of the multiple mode test is to determine how many modes of behaviour are produced 
with a view to highlighting those that could be targeted by policies. In the case of SOC as the central 
variable, it is evident that this indicator always converges towards stabilising at an equilibrium for the 
structural reasons discussed above. As highlighted by the family member test, financial indicator 
variables are driven by SOC but are sensitive to the values of exogenous parameters such as “Price per 
Mg of plant residue” which can determine the behaviour mode for a cost-benefit analysis outcome 
over time. That SOC exhibits a specific mode of behaviour regardless of crop type (goal-seeking), 
whereas the behaviour of financial indicators may present different modes of behaviour, presents 
parameters for further behaviour sensitivity analysis (section 4.2.3) and considerations for later policy 
design (Chapter 5). 
 
4.2.3 Behaviour reproduction tests 
 
Behaviour reproduction tests help determine whether the model outputs are sufficiently similar to 
the behaviour of interest in the system being studied (Barlas, 1996; Sterman, 2000). Correspondence 
between the behaviour of model outputs and actual timeseries data have already been discussed from 
the perspective of structure-oriented behaviour tests (section 4.2.2), showing that SOC behaviour 
direction and shape patterns were sufficiently similar to confirm model structure, while discrepancies 
in the absolute quantities for SOC indicator variables suggested that the model was sensitive to certain 
parameter settings given the model’s detailed (though adaptable) spatial resolution. Multiple modes 
of behaviour for financial variables were also determined to be sensitive to exogenous parameter 
values, although these did not affect land manager decision variables given that endogenous 
information feedbacks were not operating according to the conditions of the modelled Cases: in short, 
in the existing model structure, sensitivities in economic variables do not affect SOC because they are 
not endogenized as shown in Figure 12. 
That SOC behaviour is sensitive to environmental conditions and crop choice is not a new insight and 
can be explored in the original RothC-26.3 model regardless of the contribution of this thesis, such as 
through changing soil type and climatic conditions (Coleman & Jenkinson, 1996). That modelled 
behaviour of financial indicators added in this thesis are sensitive to exogenous parameter conditions 
but are not driven endogenously also has few implications for the accuracy of modelled behaviour 
when land managers do not receive information feedbacks that influence their land management 
decisions, as in the Base, Best and Worst modelled Cases. This is important, however, if policies are to 
be tested which aim to affect information feedbacks between onsite and offsite financial variables to 
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motivate changes in land management practices, such as by using natural capital investments. From 
the perspective of the model’s ability to reproduce behaviour reference modes, the sensitivity insights 
delivered through the structure-oriented behaviour tests suggest that the model is sufficiently robust. 
From a policy design and analysis perspective, the structure-oriented behaviour tests point out the 
potential for counterintuitive and non-linear behaviour to be generated if natural capital investment 
products aim to internalise economic externalities by introducing information feedback mechanisms 
between economic indicators of SOC’s contribution to ecosystem services and land management 
decisions. 
In addition to these behaviour sensitivity insights from other tests, focused sensitivity tests were also 
used. In the preceding discussion, settings for the value of the variable “Maximum potential harvested 
yield” was identified as being overoptimistic compared to historical data for barley yields at the 
Hoosfield site. In this model, the “Actual harvestable crop yield” is dynamically determined through 
“SOM influence on mean yield variability” and “Drought effect on yield given SOM status” which is 
driven by SOC, and this acts as a multiplier on the “Maximum potential harvested yield” to calculate 
the “Actual harvestable crop yield”. Runs exploring lower yields, and with or without drought 
conditions, were compared against the Worst Case. The parameter changes are shown in Table 5 and 
the results presented in Figures 17a and 17b. The results indicate that modelled SOC is not sensitive 
to drought conditions, but more so to changes in the “Maximum potential harvested yield”. This 
meaning that the reinforcing feedback loop of SOC influencing the “Actual harvestable crop yield” (R1 
in Figure 12) is less important in driving behaviour than the “Maximum potential harvested yield” as 
an exogenous input. That the SOC results for runs with drought conditions were indistinguishable from 
those without drought conditions illustrates that where drought events every 5 years may reduce the 
amount of plant material available to be added to soil (“Crop plant residue production”) in the short 
term, this is inconsequential for SOC compared to the absolute maximum yield potential. 
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Table 5: Comparison of values used in sensitivity analysis for the variable “Maximum potential 
harvested yield”. 
Run “Maximum potential 
harvested yield” (Mg ha-1) 
“SWITCH Drought conditions” 
(Dimensionless) 
Equilibrium 8.35 0 
Worst Case 7 0 
Sensitivity test 1 3.5 0 
Sensitivity test 2 3.5 1 
Sensitivity test 3 7 1 
Sensitivity test 4 0.7 0 
Sensitivity test 5 0.7 1 
 
 
Figure 17a: SOC sensitivity analysis results for 
variable “Maximum potential harvested yield”. 
Figure 17b: Actual harvestable crop yield results 
for sensitivity analysis for variable ““Maximum 
potential harvested yield”. 
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4.2.4 Validation summary 
 
Table 6 summarises the results of the model validation tests, including comments on their implications 
for model confidence, understanding of model behaviour and policy design. 
 
Table 6: Summary of validity test results and implications. 





Structure strongly grounded in published sources; opportunity 
to improve upon some proposed formulations in future work; 





Grounded in published sources; assumptions strongly 
supported; suitably tested experimental variables; structure is 
appropriate for model purpose. 
Direct extreme-
conditions  
Strongly valid Robust to direct extreme conditions. 
Boundary 
adequacy test 
Strongly valid Structural exclusions recognised and noted opportunities for 




Strongly valid Dimensionally consistent and variables with real-world 
equivalents; structure is appropriate for model purpose. 
Integration 
error 
Strongly valid Not sensitive; model setting choices appropriate. 
Qualitative 
features 
Strongly valid Direction and pattern sufficiently similar to reference mode 
behaviour; absolute values vary but reflect differences in data 
spatial scale and the local conditions to which the model 
parameters are set; structure is appropriate for model 
purpose; recommends parameter sensitivity tests to support 
results interpretation. 
Family member Strongly valid 
for this model 
structure, 
while 
Capable of producing reasonable patterns of behaviour for 
different local conditions (e.g. crop types); confirms 
adaptability of model structure to other locations beyond 
parameter ranges set for the analyses in section 4.1; 









differences in behaviour patterns between SOC indicators and 
financial indicators not significant for this model structure 
because no operating feedbacks between ecosystem services 
values and land manager decisions (Figure 12); however, test 
results suggest potential for surprising non-linear effects to 
result should policies be used to introduce such feedbacks – 
recommends consideration in policy analysis; structure is 
appropriate for model purpose and provides behaviour 
insights. 
Multiple mode Strongly valid 










Consistent modes of behaviour for SOC and other key 
biophysical variables (goal-seeking); multiple behaviour modes 
for financial indicator variables which in this structure are not 
endogenized (Figure 12) so do not lead to non-linear results; 
however, test results suggest potential for surprising non-
linear effects should policies be used to introduce feedbacks 
between biophysical, financial and decision variables – 
recommends consideration in policy analysis; structure is 






Direction and shape sufficiently similar to reference mode; 
discrepancies in absolute values traced to difference spatial 
scales of reference and model data and local conditions on 
modelled field plots; parameter sensitivities highlighted in 












Behaviour modes are consistent for biophysical variable 
confirmed; additional insight that initial stock conditions 
influence rate of change in stock indicator; multiple modes of 
behaviour for financial variables confirmed; sensitivities in 
biophysical variables traced to parameter values which 
recommends parameter sensitivity testing for model analysis; 
multiple modes of financial variable behaviour recommends 
for consideration in policy analysis. 









most sensitive  
SOC more sensitive to “Maximum potential harvested yield” 
(exogenous parameter) than “Drought effect on yield given 
SOM status” (endogenous parameter) suggests feedback loop 
R1 (Figure 12) less important than exogenous input in driving 
“Actual harvestable crop yield” which determines plant 
residue production; important for interpretation of behaviour 
in addressing Research Questions. 
 
 
4.3 Main insights from behaviour analysis and validity testing 
 
The insights generated from the model behaviour analysis and validity testing are discussed here in 
relation to the Research Questions posed in Chapter 1. Research Questions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 are 
addressed here in contribution towards Objective 1. Some provisional insights are provided for 
Research Questions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 towards Objective 2 and further assessment of Natural Capital 
Investments as presented in Chapter 5. 
 
4.3.1 Understanding of soil degradation 
 
Research Question 1.1 asks “Which dynamic structures could be responsible for promoting the decline 
of soil natural capital in England?” The results of the model analysis revealed that the stock and flow 
structure of accumulating cause and effect relationships were central to the decline in SOC as a soil 
health and natural capital indicator. This is because SOC can be considered as a stock and therefore 
depletes if the inflows of adding organic matter from crop residues or organic amendments are smaller 
than the outflows due to organic matter decay. This means that in order for SOC stocks to remain in 
equilibrium, the inflows of organic matter must equal the outflows of decay, and if SOC stock levels 
are to be increased, the inflows must exceed the outflows. This corroborates with the findings of 
Gerber (2016). The additional insight provided by this thesis is that the influence of SOC on yield 
variability according to the operationalised structure developed in this model does not represent a 
strong reinforcing mechanism to increase the input of crop residues under normal nor droughty 
condition settings. Instead the absolute long-term crop yield is more important, which is represented 
in this model as an exogenous variable. Controversy surrounding how SOC influences absolute crop 
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yield was discussed in Chapter 3, and operationalising this effect in a model based on the latest 
scientific knowledge can be considered an important contribution for future research. For the 
purposes of addressing Research Question 1.1, the insight about absolute crop yield suggests that the 
supply of organic materials, whether crop residues or FYM and other organic amendments, could be 
important, whether imported to or grown in the field: if the market supply of organic materials 
constrained means organic inputs are lower than necessary to maintain SOC equilibrium, the inflow 
will be smaller than the outflow and SOC stocks will decline (Powlton et al., 2018). The second major 
insight is that the decline in SOC could be promoted by the absence of a feedback mechanism between 
the ecosystems benefits of SOC and land management decisions (Figure 12). The model analysis 
suggests that this could be considered an example of market failure as proposed by Graves et al. (2015) 
since the majority of the economic costs of soil degradation are borne as externalities to land 
managers. The finding also implies that this also represents a limitation of existing action-oriented 
agri-environment policies and subsidy payments (Burton & Schwartz, 2013) for addressing soil 
degradation because they are not referenced to soil health indicators such as SOC. 
Research Question 1.2 asks “Which dynamic structures could be responsible for mitigating or slowing 
the decline in soil natural capital in England?” The model analysis and validity testing provide three 
points in response to this question focused on the soil health and natural capital metric SOC. The first 
is the first-order control mechanism (balancing loop B1 shown in Figure 12) whereby the outflow of 
SOC through organic matter decay is determined by the current SOC stock. This structure mitigates or 
slows the decline of SOC, producing behaviour corresponding to exponential decay, which will 
converge at an equilibrium point above zero so long as the inflow of organic matter is above zero. The 
second response to Research Question 1.2 is crop choice, since which crops are grown on a plot of 
land determine the total quantity of biomass production, and also what proportion of that crop will 
be reincorporated back into the soil. This insight was delivered by the family member validity testing 
and is an observation widely recognised in the relevant soil science literature. The third response to 
Research Question 1.2 is that reasons exogenous to the model feedback structures are responsible for 
mitigating or slowing the decline in SOC, because endogenous feedback mechanisms are absent in the 
current system: factors not related to SOC are currently affecting land managers’ decision processes 
about how to manage their SOM rather than the value of ecosystem services driven by SOC. This is an 
insight that strengthens the argument made by Graves et al. (2015) by representing the theory in an 
explicit model structure capable of quantitative simulation. 
Research Question 1.3 asks “Which of these dynamic structures relate soil health to systems of 
financial incentives and investments?” For SOC as an important soil health and natural capital 
indicator, the model analysis and validity tests confer with Graves et al. (2015) to show that that 
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changes in SOC present unrecognised economic benefits and costs to land managers, with the costs 
of declining water quality, flood protection and climate regulation being borne by offsite actors as 
externalities. If dynamic structures could relate soil health to systems of financial incentives and 
investments, these might produce different behaviour in the system. This insight can be used to help 
inform the design of policy interventions such as natural capital investments. 
 
4.3.2 Design of natural capital investment as systems interventions 
 
Research Question 2.1 asks “What are the leverage points in the dynamic structures of the system for 
reversing the decline in soil natural capital in England using natural capital investments?” The model 
analysis and validation testing offer the preliminary answer that the land managers’ lack of awareness 
about the potential economic benefits of investing in SOC could represent a potential leverage point. 
Introducing an information feedback mechanism such that land managers could recognise the 
economic value of SOC to their business could influence their decisions about how they manage crop 
residues and use FYM and other organic amendments with a view to improve their SOC stock. 
Research Question 2.2 asks “What are the strengths and opportunities for using natural capital 
investments to exploit these leverage points in the system structure for restoring soil natural capital?” 
The model analysis and validation testing offers the preliminary answer that natural capital 
investment has the potential to create a feedback mechanism to relate SOC as a soil health and natural 
capital indicator to its onsite and offsite economic benefits, and thereby influence land manager 
decision making by initiating awareness and providing financial incentives to change their practices. 
This corresponds with the portrayal of natural capital investments as feedback mechanisms for 
encouraging beneficial environmental outcomes (e.g. Natural Capital Coalition, 2016). 
Research Question 2.3 asks “What are the limitations and risks for using natural capital investments 
to exploit these leverage points in the system structure for restoring soil natural capital?” The analyses 
presented in this structure provide three preliminary responses. First, the validation tests highlighted 
the potential for high sensitivity of financial indicators to price parameters such as “Price per Mg of 
plant residue” which may not themselves be constant. In combination with the current absence of 
operating feedback mechanisms and lack of results-based policy interventions, this presents the 
possibility for natural capital investments to produce counterintuitive and nonlinear effects. Second, 
the validation testing also highlighted that different site conditions and different granularity of spatial 
data present important contextual considerations, such that natural capital investments might 
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produce desired results on some plots of land but produced undesired results on others. Third, the 
model analysis showed that in order for SOC to accumulate, inputs of organic matter must exceed the 
outflows of decay, while to achieve a constant rate of increase in SOC the inflow of organic materials 
must be increased to ever higher rates because of the balancing mechanism affecting organic matter 
decay. This is because of the balancing feedback loop B1 (Figure 12) which operates as a first order 
control mechanism. These structures also mean that it necessary to maintain organic matter inputs to 
avoid declines in SOC. This means that natural capital investments would need to incentivise long term 
conservation of SOC which may present both financial and practical challenges given that organic 
matter supply (such as FYM) might not be available. 
In Chapter 5, these preliminary answers to Research Questions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 are given further 
consideration through policy design and analysis. 
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Chapter 5. Policy Analysis 
 
5.1 Policy aims 
 
Defra has set the goal for ensuring that by 2030 all of England’s soils are being managed sustainably 
(HM Government, 2018). This thesis is focused on exploring the potential for natural capital 
investments to contribute towards this goal, using SOC as a soil health indicator and natural capital 
metric. In the design of natural capital investments as policy interventions, 2030 was considered as 
the target year for achieving desired outcomes in SOC. The policy horizon was considered as being 
from 2020 (approximately the present day) to the target year of 2030. Based on insights from the 
model analysis and validation testing (Chapter 4), the differentiation of two potential starting points 
was considered important: plots of land with poor and worsening SOC status, and those with better 
SOC status. The SOC stock values for the Worst and Base Cases at 2020 were considered to represent 
these respective situations. For the Worst Case, the policy aim was therefore considered to be to 
achieve or exceed the SOC level of the Best Case in 2020 with an increasing or stabilising trajectory, 
while for the Best Case, the policy aim was also considered to be to maintain or exceed the SOC levels 
of the Best Case in 2020 with an increasing or stabilising trajectory. These levels were used to initialise 
the DPM, RPM, BIO and HUM stocks for the policy analysis simulations shown in Table 7. Because the 
model testing identified the importance of site contextual factors in determining differences in 
absolute values between simulated and reference SOC behaviour, it was considered important to 
explore the implications of initial SOC status for policy success. 
 
Table 7: Initial conditions for policy design and analysis for the Worst and Best Cases. 
 
 Worst Best 
Initial RPM 2.66 15.1 
Initial DPM 0.115 0.542 
Initial BIO 0.393 1.96 
Initial HUM 16.9 71.5 
SOC (% w/w) 0.855 3.44 
SOC (Mg ha-1) 22.8 91.9 
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To achieve the goals set above, policies were designed based on the findings of the model analysis, 
answers to Research Questions 1.1-1.3 and preliminary answers to 2.1-2.3. The policies were designed 
to create feedback structures connecting the onsite economic benefits of SOC and the offsite 
economic benefits of SOC to land managers’ decision making about the use of crop residues and 
organic amendments. Introducing and activating such feedback mechanisms seems to be the purpose 
of natural capital investments (e.g. Natural Capital Protocol, 2016) for overcoming the issue of market 
failure as proposed by Graves et al. (2015) and demonstrated in the model analysis. These policy 
structures were introduced to the model, simulation results were analysed and validation was testing 
performed to develop further insights. 
 
5.2 Policy A 
 
5.2.1 Policy A Design 
 
“Policy A” was constructed as a farm advisory structure designed to mirror the economic analyses 
performed in the KeySoil (2010) case studies. The purpose of this policy structure was to activate a 
feedback loop between land management practices and the potential economic benefits for farmers 
of using organic materials (crop residues and manures) to increase their SOC stocks (R3, R4, R5 and B2 
in Figure 12). The purpose of the policy is therefore to initiate the farmer to invest in natural capital 
based on the ecosystem services benefits they are likely to receive. The idea is that because SOC 
delivers onsite ecosystem services, offsite actors (e.g. water companies, local councils, governments) 
receiving offsite benefits will invest in farm advice as a “kickstart” such that land managers will begin 
to invest in SOC directly themselves. The leverage point being targeted is farmers’ awareness that 
including in their accounting practices a cost-benefit assessment for the potential economic return on 
boosting their SOC stocks could be important to their business interests. 
Looking at the structure of Policy A, the variable “POLICY A Advice to farmer on benefits of returning 
crop residues” is a switch which activates “DYNAMIC POLICY A Advice to farmer on benefits of 
investing in OM”. This switches on land managers’ “DECISION To invest in OM” and leads the land 
manager to incorporate available crop residues and add organic matter at the same rate as in the 
original Best Case through 8.8 Mg ha-1 of FYM each year. The “DYNAMIC POLICY A Advice to farmer 
on benefits of investing in OM” also activates the “Initiating awareness for making CBA” which 
determines whether the land manager is making a cost-benefit assessment (CBA) of whether building 
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SOC levels offers a positive investment to them. Whether the farmer is making a CBA is represented 
by the stock “Farmer Making a CBA”. This stock activates or deactivates the switch “Farmer Decision 
to make CBA switch” which enables the calculation of the “Farmer Net benefit of OM per hectare” 
and “Farmer CB balance for investing in OM”. This structure operates on the assumed causal 
relationship described in Chapter 3 whereby the land manager will likely take the “DECISION To keep 
investing in OM” if the trend in “Farmer CB balance for investing in OM” looks like it will reach positive 
(>0) within 5 years. If so, the decision to incorporate crop residues and add FYM will become a 
“Standard practice to invest in OM”, and the variable “DYNAMIC POLICY A Advice to farmer on benefits 
of investing in OM” is switched off automatically once the land manager adopts a “Standard practice 
to invest in OM”. The expected investment by public or private bodies in deploying Policy A is 
calculated using the “Cost per acre for farm advisor” as a proxy based on reported agronomist fees 
(The Farming Forum, 2019b). The policy structures are depicted in Figures 18a and 18b according to 
their stock and flow structure of the model software. For a simplified version, Policy A introduces a 
structure which activates R3, R4, R5 and B2 in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 18a: SFD structure showing which leverage 
point Policy A targets. 
Figure 18b: stock and flow diagram of the 
policy structure for Policy A and how the 





Jonathan D. Nichols / 263851 and s1030015 / European Master in System Dynamics / Master’s Thesis Page 66 
 
5.2.2 Policy A analysis 
 
As shown in Figures 19a-19f, the effect of Policy A on SOC and the onsite and offsite ecosystem services 
benefits differed depending on whether the Policy was deployed in relation to plots with initially poor 
(Worst Case) SOC status or initially better (Best Case) SOC status. 
Without Policy A, SOC stocks decline away from the policy goal in both Cases, and with a more severe 
and rapid loss for Best Case plots. This is because in both Cases land managers are not calculating the 
cost-benefit balance of SOC and therefore are unable to recognise its importance for their business 
activities. Although in these situations there is no policy cost being incurred since Policy A is not 
activated, this results in a loss in the value of the offsite ecosystem services of water quality and flood 
regulation as well as climate regulation, thus confirming the need for intervention. The loss is more 
pronounced in the initially better (Best Case) plots because of the balancing feedback loop where the 
mineralisation rate is higher for larger SOC stocks (B1 in Figure 12). 
In contrast, introducing Policy A was able to maintain SOC levels above the target on Best Case plots, 
leading to avoided cost savings over the 10 year simulation period of around £3 ha-1 for water quality 
and flood regulation to water companies and local authorities, and £220 ha-1 for climate regulation by 
society. Introducing Policy A also increased SOC levels on the Worst Case plots, but failed to reach the 
policy target for SOC stocks by 2030 despite improving the water quality and flood regulation value by 
around £2.50 ha-1 and climate regulation value by £200 ha-1 during the ten year simulation period. 
This is because the inflows of organic matter were not sufficiently large enough to accumulate SOC at 
the required base with “normal” rates of plant residue and FYM additions (based on available plant 
residues and FYM usage rates estimated from literature). 
For the Best Case plots, funding for Policy A was only required in the first year because the “Farmer 
CB balance for investing in OM” was immediately positive, such that the farmer was assumed to want 
to continue investing in SOC once aware of its economic contribution to their business. This meant 
introducing Policy A in such circumstances only required the one-off cost of £17.30 ha-1 by water 
companies, local councils, or through a government instrument. On plots with poorer initial SOC 
status, continuing farm advice is required to keep encouraging land managers to increase SOC 
throughout the 10-year simulation period. This is because the SOC stock cannot build to sufficiently 
high levels within the 10-year time period to deliver sufficient benefits to make the adding more 
organic matter worthwhile to the farmer. This is reflected in some of the KeySoil (2010) case studies, 
where farmers’ return on investment in organic matter can take up to 15 years to “break even”. On 
Worst Case plots, the continuing need for deploying Policy A resulted in an accumulated investment 
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cost of £173 ha-1 by the end of the 10-year simulation period. There’s little reason to suppose the 
additional benefits of £223 ha-1 for climate regulation and £2.54 ha-1 for water quality and flooding 
regulation would be achieved since the farmer is unlikely to keep adding organic matter voluntarily if 
they are not seeing a return just because they are advised to. The overall net present values (NPV) 
(excluding discounting factors) to the investor of Policy A for plots with different initial SOC levels are 
presented in Table 8. They illustrate the potential added value of introducing Policy A compared to 
not introducing it, bearing in mind for Worst Case plots the investor is unlikely to realise these benefits. 
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Figure 19a: Policy A simulation results SOC Figure 19b: Policy A simulation results farmer CB 
  
Figure 19c: Policy A water and flood regulation Figure 19d: Policy A climate regulation value 
  
Figure 19e: Policy A costs over time Figure 19f: Policy A accumulated costs 
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Table 8: Net present value (NPV) results (excludes discounting) for Policy A differentiating between 
plots will initially poor (Worst Case) and good (Best Case) SOC status. Values based on accumulated 
values over policy timeframe 2020-2030. 
Initial SOC 
status 
Variables No Policy A 
(GBP) 











-2.67 225.53 228.20 55.20 
Cost: investment 
in policy 
0 173.00 173.00 





-221.43 6.72 228.15 210.85 
Investment in 
policy 
0 17.30 17.30 
 
 
5.2.3 Policy A sensitivity 
 
Sensitivity analysis was applied to the simulation runs including Policy A in order to further develop 
the preliminary answers to Research Questions 2.1-2.3 provided at the end of Chapter 4. As shown in 
Figures 19a-19f, the same type of natural capital investment mechanism can produce desired results 
on some plots of land and fail to do so not on others depending on their initial soil status (initial 
conditions). 
Chapter 4 also reported that model simulation results were sensitive to changes in the parameter 
values, particularly the “Maximum potential harvested yield” and highlighted the potential constraint 
to policy effectiveness of a shortage in FYM supply. Figures 20a-20d show that, under Best Case SOC 
conditions, low yields or periodic yield drops, FYM supply shortages, and combinations of yield drops 
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and FYM supply shortages do lead to slightly lower SOC levels and reduce water quality and climate 
regulation values. They do not however affect the land managers’ “DECISION To keep investing in OM” 
because under these circumstances the “Farmer CB balance for investing in OM” is actually higher 
than the original Best Case POLICY A simulation runs. This is because they are able to sell less crop 
residues so will need to forego less income to incorporate them into the ground and spend less on 
FYM (here assuming a fixed price). Under Worst Case initial conditions, the same low yields or periodic 
yield drops, FYM supply shortages, and combinations of yield drops and FYM supply shortages also 
lead to lower SOC levels and reduce water quality and climate regulation values. The “Farmer CB 
balance for investing in OM” is still negative for these conditions. These results indicate that although 
SOC is sensitive to these instances, the effectiveness of Policy A is exploiting the leverage point is not 
since feedback loops R3, R4, R5 and B2 in Figure 12 are operating. With these parameter conditions, 
however, they are not powerful enough because the rates of organic matter application from are 
reduced, hence their failure to reach the policy goal by 2020. 
Building on these sensitivity results, their assumption of a fixed price in FYM was explored further. As 
shown in Figures 20a-20d, changes in “Imported FYM or other organic amendment price per Mg” does 
not influence SOC levels, but does influence the “Farmer CB for investing in OM” and therefore the 
potential effectiveness of Policy A for exploiting the targeted leverage point. In Best Case initial soil 
conditions, if the FYM price increases (as it may during an FYM shortage or during high demand) by 
2.5 times (2 Mg ha-1 to 7 Mg ha-1 as is plausible according to manure prices used by KeySoil (2010)), 
the “Farmer CB for investing in OM” and Policy A needs to be reintroduced at the cost of the investor 
(water company, local council, government etc.). 
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Figure 20a: Policy A sensitivity SOC Figure 20b: Policy A sensitivity Farmer CB 
  
Figure 20c: Policy A sensitivity water and flood Figure 20d: Policy A sensitivity climate reg. 
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Figure 21a: Policy A SOC sensitivity FYM price Figure 21b: Policy A CB sensitivity FYM price 
  
Figure 21c: Policy A water sensitivity FYM price Figure 21d: Policy A climate sensitivity FYM price 
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The “Price per Mg of plant residue” was also highlighted by KeySoil (2010) as a particularly important 
factor in determining the economic return on land managers’ investments in SOM. Figures 22a and 
22b show sensitivity analysis results for different plant residue prices for the Best Case initial SOC 
conditions and Worst Case. The results illustrate that for the Best Case conditions, Policy A is 
sufficiently robust to higher levels of “Price per Mg of plant residue”, even with a variable rate (Best 
Case + Policy A Plant Residue price step x2 2022-2024), except where plant residue prices are 
consistently high from the beginning at double the base level. In these latter circumstances the land 
manager experiences negative economic benefits of investing in SOC throughout the simulation and 
therefore Policy A requires continual funding even under Best Case initial conditions with no reason 
to believe it will succeed. The results of analysis for the Worst Case show that “Price per Mg of plant 
residue” must be as low as one third to one sixth or their normal price to offer the prospect of a 
positive return for the farmer and enable deactivation of Policy A by the end of the 10 year simulation 
period. Even with the lowest crop residue price of 1 £ Mg-1 Policy A still needs to be deployed again in 
2029 to encourage land managers continue to invest in OM with the Worst Case initial soil status. 
Figure 22a: Policy A CB sensitivity residue price Figure 22b: Policy A cost sensitivity residue price  
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These results highlight the sensitivity of Policy A to “Imported FYM or other organic amendment price 
per Mg” and “Price per Mg of plant residue” even with initial Best Case status. Although the initial 
analysis (section 5.2.2) suggested Policy A could be effective under these circumstances, it is clear that 
relying on a one-shot farm advisory policy to enable land managers to include the economic value of 
SOC to their business operations in their decision making is risky: changes in “Imported FYM or other 
organic amendment price per Mg” and “Price per Mg of plant residue” could make adding these 
materials less economically viable. Both of these prices can vary at regional and local scales (KeySoil, 
2010), further highlighting the susceptibility of Policy A to these variables. Instances of FYM supply 
shortages and the “Imported FYM or other organic amendment price per Mg” are also likely to 
coincide, introducing FYM supply and demand price dynamics which are not included in this model. 
On the basis of sensitivity analysis, Policy A alone does not therefore appear to offer a robust option 
for investing in SOC as natural capital. 
Perhaps more crucial than sensitivity to these parameter settings, Policy A is structurally dependent 
on the assumption that if farm advice is being deployed, farmers will still act according to that advice 
and invest in SOC even when their return is negative in the long term (at least the 10 year period), 
even for farms with poor initial soil status. That this is an unlikely outcome provides further support 
to the argument that farm advice (Policy A) may not be enough on its own to ensure that land 
managers will be encouraged to invest in organic matter when their economic return appears to be 
negative. The potentially positive returns to natural capital investors for funding farm advice therefore 
appear to be present an unlikely prospect. These insights from the analysis of Policy A can be used to 
inform the design of further policies for testing, such as Policy B. 
 
5.3 Policy B 
 
5.3.1 Policy B Design 
 
Building on the insights delivered by Policy A, “Policy B” was designed as an attempt to try to overcome 
some of its shortcomings, particularly the unrealistic prospect of relying on land managers acting on 
advice about the benefits of investing in SOM even when they were not apparent in a cost-benefit 
analysis by the farmer. Policy B was also designed to try to overcome Policy A’s sensitivities to the 
“Imported FYM or other organic amendment price per Mg” and “Price per Mg of plant residue”, and 
ensure “Farmer CB balance for investing in OM” is positive for plots starting with poor SOC status. 
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Policy B was constructed as a payment for ecosystem services (PES) for increasing SOC stocks to 
improve water quality, flood protection and climate regulation benefits. It was therefore designed as 
a natural capital investment to be made by investors experiencing these offsite ecosystem services 
benefits, such as water companies, local councils responsible for drain clearance, and national 
government with climate change commitments. The purpose of this policy structure was to create the 
supposedly absent feedback loop between the offsite costs and benefits of soil degradation to land 
managers, thereby enabling farmers to internalise the externality created by market failure. The 
purpose of the policy is therefore for offsite entities to pay the farmer for increasing the benefits they 
are likely to receive. The idea is to enable the farmer to be paid for the offsite ecosystem services 
benefits they generate, include the income from those benefits in their balance sheet, and decide on 
that basis whether to invest in SOC on their field plot or not. The leverage point being targeted by 
Policy B is the farmers’ balance sheet. 
Looking at the structure of Policy B in Figure 23, the variable “POLICY B PES” is a switch which activates 
“POLICY B PES to Farmer” which sums the “Change in cost of nuisance sediment removal during 
simulation” and the “Net CO2 seq value accumulation”. The “POLICY B PES to Farmer” also includes a 
MAX function which chooses the highest value from the sum and the “POLICY B First five years 
investment” which acts as a minimum level of payment for the first five years of the policy (2020-
2025), intended to provide an initial stimulus for farmers to invest in SOM. This contribution is then 
added to the “Annual onsite benefits of SOM per area” which the land manager uses to calculate their 
“Farmer Net benefit of OM per hectare” and “Farmer CB balance for investing in OM”. The variable 
“POLICY PES proportion of value” sets what proportion of the total offsite ecosystems services value 
the external actor choses to pay – the default for this setting is 1, meaning that 100% of the ecosystem 
services value is paid to the land manager. POLICY B also instigates the same effects as POLICY A by 
“Initiating awareness for making CBA”, but without incurring the added costs of farm advice. This is 
because the offer of funds is assumed to initiate the farmer making a cost benefit analysis about the 
expected returns on adding more OM . Building on Figure 12, Figure 24 depicts the feedback structures 
introduced by Policy B in a CLD using simplified variables. 
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5.3.2 Policy B Analysis 
 
As shown in Figures 25a-25f, the effect of Policy B on SOC and the onsite and offsite ecosystem services 
benefits differed depending on whether the Policy was deployed in relation to plots with initially poor 
(Worst Case) SOC status or initially better (Best Case) SOC status. Without Policy B is the same as the 
runs without Policy A: SOC stocks decline away from the policy goal in both Cases with an exponential 
decay pattern that is more severe and rapid for Best Case plots. In contrast, introducing Policy B 
appears able to maintain SOC levels to achieve the policy goal on Best Case plots, leading to avoided 
cost savings over the 10-year simulation period for water quality and flood regulation to water 
companies and local authorities, and for climate regulation by society. Introducing Policy B also 
increased SOC levels on the Worst Case plots, but failed to reach the policy target for SOC stocks by 
2030 despite improvements in water quality, flood regulation and climate regulation value during the 
10-year simulation period. 
For the Best Case plots, investment enabled the mitigation of almost all the potential costs posed by 
the No Policy simulation. The costs were highest during the first five years to ensure the “Farmer CB 
balance” for investing in OM was positive, which could then be reduced to the value of the offsite 
ecosystem services being provided by SOC. The assumption here is that farmers would continue 
investing in OM additions because the PES enabled the “Farmer CB balance for investing in OM” to 
stay positive. In dynamic terms, the reinforcing loops R3-R7 were able to exert enough influence 
despite the strong action of the balancing mechanisms of B2 and B3 (Figure 24). Despite this however, 
the overall value of offsite ecosystem services was still negative, with the natural capital investment 
only enabling the avoidance of additional costs compared to a situation without the investment. This 
is because the SOC stock cannot build to sufficiently high levels within the 10-year time period at the 
rate of organic matter being applied and the balancing mechanism of B1. 
On Worst Case plots, the overall investment costs were higher because on these plots it was possible 
to achieve a large spike in initial ecosystem services benefits due to the sudden net gain in SOC 
sequestration, although these cost decreased over the course of the simulation as the net 
sequestration capacity of the soil declined as equilibrium was approached. This is the balancing 
feedback loop B3 in Figure 24. Despite improvements, however, the policy goal was not achieved. 
The overall net present value (NPV) (excluding discounting factors) for Policy B are presented in Table 
9. The results show that introducing Policy B on Best Case plots delivered overall net benefits through 
cost avoidances compared to not introducing it, whereas on Worst Case plots the costs outweighed 
the benefits.  
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Figure 25a: Policy B results SOC Figure 25b: Policy B results Farmer CB 
  
Figure 25c: Policy B results water and flooding Figure 25d: Policy B results climate 
  
Figude 25e: Policy B results costs over time Figue 25f: Policy B results accumulated costs 
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Table 9: Net present value (NPV) results (excludes discounting) for Policy B differentiating between 
plots will initially poor (Worst Case) and good (Best Case) SOC status. Values based on accumulated 
values over policy timeframe 2020-2030. 
Initial SOC 
status 
Variables No Policy A 
(GBP) 











-2.67 211.11 213.78 -19.22 
Cost: investment 
in policy 
0 233.00 233.00 





-221.43 -7.27 214.16 102.16 
Investment in 
policy 
0 112.00 112.00 
 
5.3.3 Policy B sensitivity 
 
Sensitivity analysis was applied to the simulation runs including Policy B to further develop the 
preliminary answers to Research Questions 2.1-2.3 provided at the end of Chapter 4 and to test the 
extent to which Policy B could offer any improvements on Policy A. 
Policy A was determined to be most sensitive to the parameter settings “Price per Mg of plant residue” 
and “Imported FYM or other organic amendment price per Mg”. Policy B was therefore simulated 
using these same settings to explore variations in their values. Figures 26a-26d show the results for 
initially poor SOC status plots (Worst Case). As in Policy A, these parameters influence the “Farmer CB 
balance for investing in OM” making it less attractive for land managers to invest in SOC even while 
receiving income from PES. The challenge is also that the PES benefits they generate are small because 
only small improvements in SOC are occurring through occasional organic inputs when the “Farmer 
CB balance for investing in OM” looks more positive. This highlights a potential disadvantage of 
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determining PES based on the benefits being generated at the present time since small benefits will 
drive only smaller payments, hence the need for the “POLICY B First five years investment”. 
Figure 26a: Policy B sens. Worst Case SOC Figure 26b: Policy B sens. Worst Case CB 
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Figures 27a-27d show the sensitivity results for initially good SOC status plots (Best Case) to which 
Policy B is applied. It can be seen that, as on initially poor SOC status plots, changes in these 
parameters influence the “Farmer CB balance for investing in OM” to make it less attractive for land 
managers to invest in SOC even while receiving PES. However, the policy is more robust on Best Case 
plots to ensuring the policy goal for SOC is met while returning a net positive return for the investor, 
except where the “Imported FYM or other organic amendment price per Mg” is five times the base 
cost of 2 £ Mg-1. This is because in all other cases except this one, the benefits the farmer is receiving 
for their own operations sufficiently outweigh the costs, meaning that the PES is less important in 
their case. This analysis highlights that, where SOC status is already good, it is more the effect of the 
PES as a trigger for accounting for the costs and benefits of SOC that encourage farmers to continue 
investing in SOC rather than the PES amount itself. In dynamic terms, the feedback from onsite 
ecosystem services (R3, R4 and 45) is stronger than the feedback from offsite ecosystem services (R6 
and R7), although for Policy B the latter is needed to initiate the former. Again, this illustrates the 
differences in policy outcomes for differential initial SOC conditions and the structural reasons behind 
them. 
The simulation results for Policy B on plots with initially poor SOC status show that, although the policy 
might be able to exploit the leverage points to which it as targeted and initiate some improvements 
in SOC stocks and ecosystem services value, the target SOC levels of the policy goal cannot be achieved 
by 2030. This is because larger than normal organic matter additions would need to be made. The 
model was therefore used to determine under what conditions the policy goal could be reached. The 
aim was to provide insights using a “what if” scenario and gauge the level of policy effort that might 
be required. To achieve the policy goal, assuming all other parameters including the “Maximum 
potential harvested yield” and Policy B cost parameters remained constant, for plots with initially poor 
SOC status to achieve the policy goal, 55 Mg ha-1 of FYM would need to be added each year. For the 
investor, this would require funds of 971 GBP ha-1 over the 10-year period. Changing the parameters 
in the Policy B structure it was determined that these results for SOC could also be achieved with 
“POLICY PES proportion of value” set at 0.5 which would require the smaller investment of 503 GBP 
ha-1 while still providing a net positive return. However, whether such application rates can be 
achieved over the necessary temporal and spatial scales is questionable: this is a far higher than 
normal FYM application rate (KeySoil, 2010) and whether such quantities of available FYM can be 
sourced is doubtful. Such demand could also impact the FYM price. The use organic amendments 
other than FYM such as compost could be promising (Powlson et al., 2011), but whether this quantity 
is available is uncertain. These results illustrate the difficulty of achieving desirable SOC levels in the 
policy timeframe for plots with low initial soil status even with incentives that could change behaviour.  
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Figure 27a: Policy B sens. Best Case SOC Figure 27b: Policy B sens. Best Case Farmer CB 
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5.4 Main insights from policy analysis and testing 
 
The insights generated during the policy analysis and sensitivity testing are discussed here in relation 
to the Research Questions 2.1-2.3 posed in Chapter 1 and the preliminary answers proposed in 
Chapter 4. 
 
5.4.1 Leverage points for natural capital investment 
 
Research Question 2.1 asks “What are the leverage points in the dynamic structures of the system for 
reversing the decline in soil natural capital in England using natural capital investments?” The model 
analysis and validation testing in Chapter 4 offered the preliminary answer that the land managers’ 
lack of awareness about the potential economic benefits of SOC for their business could represent a 
potential leverage point. Policies A and B were therefore designed as natural capital investments 
which would introduce an information feedback mechanism focused on this leverage point (Figure 
24). 
Policy A was designed to advise farmers of the benefits of increasing SOC stocks and enable them to 
make a cost benefit assessment of adding more organic matter, initiating their awareness and 
operating on the assumption that farmers would act on the advice to continue investing in SOC if they 
could forecast a positive return after five years. Analysis and testing demonstrated that targeting this 
leverage point with Policy A was likely capable of achieving the policy goal on field plots with already 
good initial SOC levels at the beginning of the policy timeframe. This was because SOC levels were 
already sufficiently large to produce significant onsite ecosystem services, and land managers 
accounting for these pre-existing contributions presented an immediate positive net benefit which 
would likely encourage them to invest in SOC. However, analysis and testing of Policy A suggested that 
for field plots with initially poor SOC status, operating this leverage point was likely to require more 
than awareness raising and farmers accounting for the benefits of SOC. This was because farmers’ 
activities to build SOC stocks would be unlikely to offer a net economic benefit within the 10-year 
policy timeframe due to the high costs involved. 
Policy B was designed as a stronger attempt to influence this leverage point through the introduction 
of an additional feedback structure in the form of a PES scheme. The aim of Policy B was to enable 
land managers internalise external ecosystem services costs and benefits of SOC in their decisions 
about how they use crop residues and organic amendments by being paid by offsite actors for the 
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offsite benefits (or cost mitigations) SOC could generate. This included an initial five-year fixed 
payment to help land managers with initially poor status soils overcome the barrier of negative returns 
(counteracting balancing loop B2 in Figure 24) if they had to fund the SOC improvements themselves. 
Like Policy A, the analysis for Policy B confirmed managers’ awareness of the cost benefit balance of 
maintaining and improving SOC levels could be a leverage point for achieving the policy goal on field 
plots with already good initial soil status. This is because Policy B would enable farmers to be further 
incentivised to continue investing in SOC because of the benefits they were not only receiving for their 
own business but also from the PES payment. In contrast to Policy A, Policy B demonstrated that 
farmer awareness and accounting of the economic benefits of SOC could also be used as a leverage 
point for improving SOC stocks on field plots with initially poor SOC status. This was because the initial 
five-year payment and subsequent receipt of the PES based on their offsite benefits from offsite 
sources could provide a sufficiently strong economic incentive. Nevertheless, despite the ability of 
Policy B in making use of this leverage point, in circumstances of initially poor soil status Policy B was 
still unable to reach the policy goal within the policy timeframe. This suggests that land manager 
awareness and accounting of the ecosystem services benefits of SOC does present a leverage point 
for behavioural change, but the success of using this leverage point and achieving the policy goal is 
dependent on the initial SOC status of the target field plot. That an investor with interests in multiple 
plots (e.g. at the catchment scale) might use the returns on investment on initially good SOC status 
plots to further incentivise those with poor initial SOC status could be explored in future work. 
 
5.4.2 Strengths and opportunities of using natural capital investment 
 
Research Question 2.2 asks “What are the strengths and opportunities for using natural capital 
investments to exploit these leverage points in the system structure for restoring soil natural capital?” 
In Chapter 4 it was proposed that natural capital investments could be used to create feedback 
mechanisms relating SOC as a soil health and natural capital indicator to its economic benefits and 
thereby influence the behaviour of the land manager. Policy A was designed to introduce such a 
feedback mechanism through farm advice whereby farmers would become aware of and account for 
the economic benefits of SOC for their own business. The strength of this type of natural capital 
investment is that for field plots with already good SOC status it could represent a “one off” 
investment for offsite actors since it is assumed farmers will be motivated to invest in SOC themselves 
once they recognise the benefits it already delivers for their business. The opportunity Policy A 
presents is that it is also a net positive investment for offsite actors since they can use it to mitigate 
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potential costs they would incur if good soil status plots were allowed to degrade. Sensitivity testing 
revealed that for plots with initially good SOC status, Policy A was robust to some changes in plant 
residue prices, FYM prices and crop yields, indicating a further strength of the intervention. For plots 
with initially good SOC status Policy B was shown to be even more robust to more extreme changes in 
these parameters influences while still presenting a net positive investment for offsite actors 
compared to bearing the costs of soil degradation without such a policy. That both Policy A and B 
could achieve the policy goal of maintaining good SOC status on plots with initially good SOC status is 
another strength of both of these types of natural capital investments. For plots with initially poor SOC 
status, Policy A was not considered an effective intervention. At such locations Policy B could alter 
land manager behaviour to invest in SOC by providing a sufficient economic incentive and could 
improve SOC stocks, but failed to achieve the policy goal. These results suggest that under certain 
circumstances (most crucially the initial soil health conditions) both farm advice and PES natural 
capital investments can present the opportunity of achieving desired changes in SOC stocks and 
deliver positive returns on investments while being reasonable robust to changes in variables that can 
affect land managers’ economic incentives. 
 
5.4.3 Limitations and risks of using natural capital investment 
 
Research Question 2.3 asks “What are the limitations and risks for using natural capital investments 
to exploit these leverage points in the system structure for restoring soil natural capital?” The 
preliminary analyses in Chapter 4 provided three initial responses: that natural capital investments 
might produce desired results on some plots of land but not on others, high sensitivity of financial 
indicators to price parameters such as “Price per Mg of plant residue”, and the financial and practical 
challenges of ensuring sufficient organic matter inputs for achieving policy goals. 
The policy analysis and sensitivity testing confirmed the first point: one limitation of using natural 
capital investments to exploit the farmer awareness leverage point was indeed dependent on the 
initial SOC status with greater investment effort needed for sites with initially poor SOC status than 
those with initially good SOC status, despite the ability of the former to produce improvements in 
ecosystem services value. The policy analysis and sensitivity testing also illustrated that, although PES 
investments (Policy B) were more likely to produce behavioural change and with greater robustness 
to sensitivity than those using farm advice (Policy A), these interventions might still be unable to 
achieve the policy goal on initially poor status plots despite some improvements in SOC levels. This is 
because of the delay in SOC accumulation and the diminishing rate of SOC accumulation (assuming a 
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constant organic input) resulting from balancing loop B1. This limitation of natural capital investment 
relates to the fact that although incentives can be created through investment mechanisms and 
change land manager behaviour, the dynamic structure of biophysical processes may constrain the 
potential for achieving natural capital stock goals within the policy timeframe depending on the initial 
natural capital stocks of particular target sites. 
The policy analysis and sensitivity testing also provided confirmation on the second point: the success 
of natural capital investments could indeed be sensitive to certain price parameters farmers consider 
in their cost benefit assessment of whether to improve SOC stocks or not. The policy testing in this 
Chapter was able to add value to this suggestion by quantifying and comparing sensitivities between 
different price variables and under different initial SOC conditions. The results demonstrated that farm 
advice (Policy A) was reasonably robust and PES (Policy B) highly robust to changes in “Price per Mg 
of plant residue” and “Imported FYM or other organic amendment price per Mg” for field plots with 
initially good soil status. This is because of the initially good SOC stock which provides a “buffer” 
against price and input fluctuations while providing a stronger supply of benefits to the farmer. In 
contrast, farm advice (Policy A) could only be effective on sites with initially low SOC status with 
constantly very low plant residue prices. PES (Policy B) proved to be more robust to crop residue and 
FYM prices than farm advice on initially low SOC status sites because it provided an economic incentive 
for overcoming the initially low SOC ecosystem services benefits to their business. These analyses 
highlight the risks posed by plant residue and FYM price fluctuations to the success of natural capital 
investments for both exploiting leverage points for behavioural change and influencing biophysical 
processes. Such risks need to be accounted for in the design of policies, such as the “PES first five years 
investment” as a stimulus to resist balancing loop B2. These analyses also confirm the initial conditions 
limitation discussed earlier. In the same way, plant residue and FYM prices present an additional 
spatial dimension, since these can vary locally and regionally (KeySoil, 2010). 
The policy analysis and sensitivity testing also provided further insights into the potential financial and 
practical challenge to achieving policy goals as first posed in Chapter 4, such as ensuring sufficient 
organic matter inputs are available. Policy B was shown to be sensitive to changes in the “Maximum 
potential harvested yield” and the FYM supply available for the “Mean annual input of FYM or other 
organic amendment” which control organic inputs. Policy B was robust to these changes in terms of 
behavioural change on initially good SOC status sites. Policy B was also relatively robust here in 
achieving the target or close to the policy target for SOC by 2030. Again, this was due to the initially 
high SOC levels where larger natural capital stocks provided resilience against occasional fluctuations 
in inputs due to the stock accumulation-depletion delay. Policy B was also reasonably robust to these 
changes in terms of delivering behavioural change for the land manager of sites with initially poor SOC 
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status. However, such fluctuations posed even greater challenges for SOC indicators which remained 
only a little higher than equilibrium. This highlights a potential risk for natural capital investments that 
although they might provide land managers with an economic incentive to change behaviour, they 
may be unable to produce or buy-in sufficient organic matter to increase their SOC stocks at a 
sufficient rate to achieve the policy goal within the policy timeframe. In England, FYM supplies are 
considered to be fully utilised, although there appears potential for using composted green waste 
(Powlson et al., 2011). Dynamic relationships between FYM supply, demand and prices were not 
included in the model structure, although such relationships could pose related risks between financial 
sensitivities and practical issues. For example, if FYM is in short supply, the price might increase, 
meaning there is less economic incentive for land managers to buy FYM to increase their SOC levels 
regardless of the PES payment available to them. Natural capital investment interventions should be 
designed to be resilient to such effects and this presents an opportunity for future research. 
The policy analysis and sensitivity testing provided an additional insight regarding limitations and risks 
of natural capital investments for reversing soil degradation. This related to the value of SOC 
investment outcomes for the investor, here considered as an offsite entity (water company, local 
council, national government) benefiting from the offsite ecosystem services generated from SOC. 
The business case for these offsite entities investing in farm advice (Policy A) and PES (Policy B) to 
continue receiving the ecosystem services benefits of SOC and avoiding the costs of degradation is 
clear for plots with initially good SOC status, as indicated by the positive NPV of investment for these 
sites. However, the business case for offsite entities investing in farm advice on sites with initially poor 
SOC status unclear: such interventions are unlikely to produce the forecast benefits because the land 
manager does not receive a sufficient economic incentive. The NPV of investment in PES on these sites 
with is also less attractive than not deploying a policy because the costs of investment outweigh the 
benefits investors can expect to gain within the policy timeframe. Again, this is due to the slow 
accumulation of the SOC stock, feedback loops B1 and B2, and the requirement for the initial five-year 
payment for sites with initially poor status which increase the funding burden on the investor. The 
discussion reveals the limitation that, because natural capital investments operate on the basis of 
economic incentives for both the land manager and the offsite beneficiary, if there is no clear 
economic incentive for the investor then the investment is unlikely to be made. This is particularly 
problematic both in the context of Defra’s broader policy aim for ensuring sustainable soil 
management, since the business case for investing to maintain sites with currently good SOC status is 
clear, but the case for investing to increase SOC levels where the status is poor is not. These insights 
can be considered valuable from both a commercial investment perspective and from the perspective 
of public policy.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusions 
 
6.1 Answers to Research Questions 
 
The first three Research Questions 1.1-1.3 were focused on identifying the dynamic structures 
underlying soil natural capital degradation in England, and highlighting dynamics linking soil health 
metrics to systems of financial investments and incentives. Soil organic carbon (SOC) was the metric 
used. These questions were addressed through model analysis and validity testing from which the 
following conclusions were drawn. 
Research Question 1.1: “Which dynamic structures could be responsible for promoting the decline of 
soil natural capital in England?” 
• Stocks and flows: the stock and flow structure of accumulating cause and effect relationships 
are central to the historic decline in SOC. This is because SOC is a stock and therefore depletes 
if the inflows of adding organic carbon (e.g. from crop residues or farmyard manure) are 
smaller than the outflows of mineralisation during organic matter decay. Trends of declining 
SOC are due to smaller inflows of organic matter than outflows of decay in the long term. 
• No feedbacks: feedback mechanisms between SOC, soil ecosystems services, land 
management decisions and existing policies are absent. The model provides an operational 
and quantified structure to support the market failure hypothesis proposed by Graves et al. 
(2015) and highlights the limitation of existing action-oriented agri-environment policy. 
Research Question 1.2: “Which dynamic structures could be responsible for mitigating or slowing the 
decline in soil natural capital in England?” 
• Balancing feedback loop: the outflow of SOC through organic matter decay is determined by 
the current SOC stock level via a first order control. This structure mitigates or slows the 
decline of SOC producing goal-seeking behaviour patterns of exponential decay. 
• Exogenous influences: reasons unrelated to SOC are also responsible for mitigating or slowing 
the decline in SOC as well as promoting it due to the absence of feedback mechanisms. This 
means that factors not related to SOC are currently influencing land managers’ decision 
processes about how to manage the SOC stock which slow the degradation process. Again, 
examples include action-oriented agri-environmental policies. 
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Research Question 1.3 “Which of these dynamic structures relate soil health to systems of financial 
incentives and investments?” 
• They don’t: the costs of soil degradation and loss of soil ecosystem services due to declining 
SOC are currently externalities to land managers’ financial decision making. Changes in SOC 
present unrecognised potential economic benefits and costs to land managers’ businesses, 
while the offsite actors bearing the economic burden of declining water quality, loss of flood 
protection and reduced ability to regulate climate due to declines in SOC. 
The last three Research Questions 2.1-2.3 were focused on identifying opportunities and limitations 
for the effectiveness of natural capital investments for regenerating soils in England. These questions 
were addressed by designing and testing two policies in the simulation model with the goal of 
achieving good SOC status by 2030 following their introduction in 2020. “Policy A” was an investment 
in farm advice which would activate an information feedback loop between the onsite ecosystem 
services benefits of SOC and land managers’ cost-benefit assessment of their organic matter related 
practices. “Policy B” was a payment for ecosystem services (PES) by which beneficiaries of SOC’s offsite 
ecosystem services paid farmers to maintain or improve SOC status. Policy sensitivities to initial SOC 
status, price variables and available organic matter supplies were compared. The results of the policy 
analysis enabled the following conclusions to be drawn. 
Research Question 2.1 “What are the leverage points in the dynamic structures of the system for 
reversing the decline in soil natural capital in England using natural capital investments?” 
• Land managers’ lack of awareness about the potential economic benefits of SOC for their own 
business: this was considered a suitable leverage point with which to target farm advice 
investments (Policy A) for land managers whose field plots had an initially good SOC status at 
the beginning of the policy timeframe. This is because the unrecognised economic 
contributions of already sufficient SOC levels already exceed the costs to the farmer of adding 
the necessary inputs to maintain them. This was not the case for plots with initially poor SOC 
status because the costs to the farmer of increasing SOC outweigh the benefits until a higher 
level of SOC is achieved. 
• Land managers’ cost-benefit assessment of the ecosystem services value of SOC and organic 
matter inputs: this was considered a suitable leverage point with which to target PES 
investments (Policy B) by those benefiting from the offsite ecosystem services of SOC. Using 
this leverage point it is possible to change the behaviour of land managers to add more organic 
matter whose field plots had either an initially good or initially poor SOC status at the 
beginning of the policy timeframe. It works by increasing farm income from offsite actors who 
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benefit from SOC. However, targeting this leverage point could only succeed in achieving the 
policy goal for field plots with initially good soil status. Targeting this leverage point could not 
achieve the SOC policy target on plots with initially poor soil status due to the unrealistically 
high quantities organic material required to provide a sufficient inflow rate. 
Research Question 2.2 “What are the strengths and opportunities for using natural capital investments 
to exploit these leverage points in the system structure for restoring soil natural capital?” 
• Creating feedbacks: farm advisory and PES natural capital investments have the potential to 
create missing feedback mechanisms relating SOC to its economic benefits and influencing 
the behaviour of the land managers to increase organic matter applications. 
• Achieve (or work towards) policy goals: for field plots with initially good SOC status both farm 
advisory and PES investments can initiate behaviour change and achieve the SOC policy target 
by 2030. For field plots with initially poor SOC status, a PES investment has potential to initiate 
behavioural change and can increase SOC stocks towards (but not reach) the policy goal by 
2030. 
• One-off investments: for plots with initially good soil status, farm advisory investments proved 
reasonably robust to changes in organic materials price and supply variables and might need 
only be made as a one-off investment. This is because land managers with already good SOC 
status may only need to be stimulated once to recognise the benefits of SOC to their business 
of improving SOC. For investors, this means that large or long-term capital expenditures are 
unlikely to be required for these sites. 
• Net positive investments: for plots with initially good SOC status, benefits in advisory and PES 
investments for offsite funders yield a net positive return by 2030. This is because these 
investments mitigate the costs they would incur if initially good SOC status plots are allowed 
to degrade. 
Research Question 2.3 “What are the limitations and risks for using natural capital investments to 
exploit these leverage points in the system structure for restoring soil natural capital?” 
• Natural capital investments can produce desired results on some land plots but not others: 
farm advisory investments were only effective in exploiting farmer awareness of the economic 
benefits of SOC for plots with good initial SOC status. This is because land managers with plots 
of initially poor soil status are unlikely to have a positive cost-benefit analysis of increasing 
organic matter applications within the policy timeframe. 
• Natural capital investments can be sensitive to price parameters depending on initial SOC 
conditions: policy analysis demonstrated that although farm advice and PES investments were 
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reasonably robust to changes in plant residue and imported FYM prices for field plots with 
good initial SOC status, they were less robust for plots with poor initial status. This is because 
initially high SOC stocks provide a “buffer” against fluctuations in prices and organic matter 
additions, whereas low SOC levels do not. PES investments were more robust than advisory 
investments overall. 
• Insufficient supplies of organic matter could hinder efforts to achieve desired SOC levels: 
although PES investments may be more robust than advisory investments, both policies are 
susceptible to shortages in organic matter supply over the long term, and more so for plots 
with initially low SOC stocks. This is because although the policies could produce behavioural 
change by activating farmer awareness and providing additional income, if supplies of organic 
matter (either from crop residues due to low crop yields or due to high market demand for 
FYM) are not sufficient to at least maintain SOC equilibrium, over the long term the PES land 
managers can receive will decrease as SOC stocks decline following lower organic matter 
applications. This represents a negative consequence of reliance on a reinforcing feedback 
loop for natural capital investment mechanisms. 
• Returns to the natural capital investor might not always be net positive: the business case for 
offsite entities (water companies, local councils, national governments) investing in farm 
advice and PES to continue receiving the ecosystem services benefits of SOC and avoiding the 
costs of degradation is clear for plots with initially good SOC status because financial gains are 
greater than costs. However, the business case for offsite entities investing in the farm advice 
or PES mechanisms on sites with initially poor SOC status are likely incapable of producing 
positive returns. This is because the land manager either does not receive a sufficient 
economic incentive or because of the long delay times in increasing SOC to sufficient levels 
with available organic matter supplies. The investor is therefore unable to receive a return 
within the policy timeframe under these circumstances, meaning that these investments are 
unlikely to be made in the first place, even though some improvements in SOC levels could be 
made. The potential for investors to use returns from investments in initially good status soils 
to subsidise improvements initially poor status soils was highlighted for further consideration 
in future research. 
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6.2 Broader implications and next steps 
 
The insights produced in this thesis can also contribute to knowledge about and management of other 
natural capital assets, such as water and biodiversity. The work complements natural resources 
management literature which already recognises the importance of stocks, flows and feedback 
processes (Moxnes, 2000) by illustrating how management decisions can be linked to resource quality 
metrics and the ecosystem services value that natural capital stocks generate. The work also offers 
insights which are likely to be transferable to other sustainability issues to which natural capital 
investment could be applied, such as the importance of initial conditions, feedbacks (or their absence), 
and how such interventions can be designed and tested with the help of a simulation model. These 
contributions are relevant to both policy makers interested in the potential of natural capital 
investments, as well as investors and suppliers of ecosystem services, to help recognise the 
opportunities and risks of using natural capital investments to achieve desired outcomes. Perhaps 
most importantly, this thesis highlights that although there is promise for natural capital investment 
to harness the power of reinforcing feedback mechanisms to improve natural capital stocks, deliver 
greater ecosystem services benefits and generate positive returns on investment, this process can also 
work in reverse, while balancing feedback mechanisms can place limitations on how far and how 
quickly desired results can be achieved if at all. 
Two recommendations are suggested for how the insights and simulation model developed in this 
thesis can be used and improved upon further. First, the model could be used as part of a participatory 
engagement effort including policy stakeholders. The model could be used in such a setting as both 
the basis for critical discussion and as a repository of existing knowledge. In this way the model could 
facilitate the improvement of collective understanding of the soil degradation problem and synthesise 
the tacit knowledge of stakeholders with the secondary data. This could help achieve the dual purpose 
of improving some of the uncertainties in the model structure highlighted by the analysis (Andersen 
et al., 2012; Richardson, 2013) while also facilitating the design, testing and evaluation of policies 
(Gilbert et al., 2018). Second, the model could be adapted to serve the purpose of a natural capital 
investment appraisal tool to be used by natural capital investors and suppliers. To enable this, it is 
recommended that the existing model and insights of this research should be demonstrated to 
potential users, such as policy analysts, natural capital investors and those with natural capital assets 
who are seeking investment. A survey of product user requirements should be a key component of 
this demonstration to understand what questions investors and suppliers would be interested in the 
tool being able to answer. The model’s existing functionality and validity should then be reviewed 
against these requirements and a product development proposal can be devised.  
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Appendix: model documentation 
 
Three electronic Stella files are attached to this thesis: 
• “RothC_Stella_rebuild_04.stmx” which is the quantified system dynamics model translated 
from the original RothC-26.3 model (set in equilibrium); 
• “Model_Nichols2019_Soil_natural_capital_investment.stmx” which is the complete model 
built and used in this thesis (set with policy switches off, parameterised for “Worst Case” initial 
SOC stock conditions); 
• “Model_Nichols2019_Soil_natural_capital_investment.isdb” which contains all the data from 
all of the model runs referred to in the text. 
 
The remaining pages of this thesis provide the remaining model documentation. These notes are 





Drought_conditions = IF(SWITCH_Drought_conditions=0) THEN 1 ELSE (1+PULSE(-0.5, 10, 
Potential_drought_frequency)) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Potential_drought_frequency = 5 {every 5 years} 
    UNITS: Years 
Ref_mode_intercept = 69.3 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Ref_mode_slope = -0.0333 
    UNITS: Per Year 
SWITCH_Drought_conditions = 0 
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    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Time_series_data_for_SOC_on_arable_land = Ref_mode_slope*TIME+Ref_mode_intercept 





Carbon_fraction_of_FYM_or_other_organic_amenedment = 0.34 {0.34 for FYM from ADAS mean 
from straw and manure report} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Carbon_fraction_of_plant_residues = 0.4 {-Straw used for fuel purposes usually contains 14 – 20% 
moisture that vaporises during burning. The remaining dry matter consists of less than 50% carbon 
https://www.teagasc.ie/media/website/publications/2010/868_StrawForEnergy-1.pdf -These 
estimates assumed that half of the non-grain/seed biomass was returned in the stubble and chaff 
(Anon., 1997), that root dry matter production was equivalent to c.8% of shoot dry matter (Gregory 
et al., 1978) and that all dry matter contained 40% OC (Powlson et al., 1985). ADAS report on straw 
and manure SOC} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
CHECK_Input_of_carbon_from_plant_residues = 1.91 {1.91 equilibrium setting} 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Check_proportion = 1 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
DECISION_Add_FYM_or_other_organic_amendment = 
IF(SWITCH_DECISION_Mean_annual_input_of_FYM_or_other_organic_amendment_1_CHECK_cons
tant_input_break_feedback_2_Automated_via_feedback=2) THEN DECISION_To_invest_in_OM ELSE 
SWITCH_DECISION_Mean_annual_input_of_FYM_or_other_organic_amendment_1_CHECK_consta
nt_input_break_feedback_2_Automated_via_feedback 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
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DECISION_Proportion_of_recoverable_plant_residue_returned_to_field = IF 
(SWITCH_Proportion_of_recoverable_plant_residue_returned_to_field_1_CHECK_constant_input_b
reak_feedback_2_Automated_via_feedback = 1) THEN (Check_proportion) ELSE 
(Proportion_of_recoverable_plant_residue_returned_to_field) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
DECISION_To_invest_in_OM = IF 
(SWITCH_1_Exogenous_reason_to_invest_in_SOM_2_Dynamic_reason_to_invest_in_SOM=1) THEN 
1 ELSE (MAX(DYNAMIC_POLICY_A_Advice_to_farmer_on_benefits_of_investing_in_OM, 
Standard_practice_to_invest_in_OM)) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
DECISION_To_keep_investing_in_OM = IF(FORCST(Farmer_CB_balance_for_investing_in_OM, 1, 5)> 
0) AND(TIME>(STARTTIME+1)) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
DYNAMIC_POLICY_A_Advice_to_farmer_on_benefits_of_investing_in_OM = 
IF(DECISION_To_keep_investing_in_OM =0) THEN 
POLICY_A_Advice_to_farmer_on_benefits_of_returning_crop_residues ELSE 0 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Farmer_Making_a_CBA(t) = Farmer_Making_a_CBA(t - dt) + (Initiating_awareness_for_making_CBA) 
* dt 
    INIT Farmer_Making_a_CBA = Initial_making_CBA 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
    INFLOWS: 
        Initiating_awareness_for_making_CBA = 
((DYNAMIC_POLICY_A_Advice_to_farmer_on_benefits_of_investing_in_OM-
Farmer_Making_a_CBA)+SWITCH_POLICY_B)/Time_to_awareness {UNIFLOW} 
            UNITS: Per Year 
FYM_or_other_organic_amendment_available = 1 {Poulton et al 2019 access to manure as potential 
limitation} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 




    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Initial_making_CBA = 0 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Mean_annual_input_of_FYM_or_other_organic_amendment = 55 {In eq for FYM use 8.82 for 3 
Mg/Ha/Year with 34% C} 








    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Minimum_proportion_of_recoverable_plant_residue_being_returned = 0 {use 0.285 for RothC 
unmanured as Base Case,  0 for Worst Case} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Proportion_of_recoverable_plant_residue_returned_to_field = IF DECISION_To_invest_in_OM =1 
THEN 1 ELSE Minimum_proportion_of_recoverable_plant_residue_being_returned 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Standard_practice_to_invest_in_OM = DECISION_To_keep_investing_in_OM 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
SWITCH_1_CHECK_constant_input_break_feedback_2_Automated_via_feedback = 2 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
SWITCH_1_Exogenous_reason_to_invest_in_SOM_2_Dynamic_reason_to_invest_in_SOM = 2 
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    UNITS: Dimensionless 
SWITCH_DECISION_Mean_annual_input_of_FYM_or_other_organic_amendment_1_CHECK_consta
nt_input_break_feedback_2_Automated_via_feedback = 2 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
SWITCH_Proportion_of_recoverable_plant_residue_returned_to_field_1_CHECK_constant_input_br
eak_feedback_2_Automated_via_feedback = 2 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Time_to_awareness = DT 





Accumulated_net_CO2_seq_value(t) = Accumulated_net_CO2_seq_value(t - dt) + 
(Net_CO2_seq_value_accumulation) * dt 
    INIT Accumulated_net_CO2_seq_value = 0 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares 
    INFLOWS: 
        Net_CO2_seq_value_accumulation = Annual_value_of_net_CO2_sequestration_in_soil_by_area 
            UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Accumulated_value_of_change_in_nuisance_sediment_removal(t) = 
Accumulated_value_of_change_in_nuisance_sediment_removal(t - dt) + 
(Change_in_cost_of_nuisance_sediment_removal_during_simulation) * dt 
    INIT Accumulated_value_of_change_in_nuisance_sediment_removal = 0 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares 
    INFLOWS: 
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        Change_in_cost_of_nuisance_sediment_removal_during_simulation = 
Initial_Cost_of_nuisance_sediment_per_source_ha-Cost_of_nuisance_sediment_per_source_ha 




    UNITS: GBP/Years 
Annual_cost_of_nuisance_sediment_removal = 
Nuisance_Sediment_Removal_Capacity*Cost_per_ton_of_nuisance_sediment_removal 
    UNITS: GBP/Years 
Annual_value_of_net_CO2_sequestration_in_soil_by_area = 
Net_C_sequestration_by_soil*CO2_price*Conversion_to_measure_cost_of_C_rather_than_CO2 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Climate_regulation_value = Accumulated_net_CO2_seq_value 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares 
CO2_price = 51 {CO2 e } {Graves et al 2015 For the purpose here, however, a policy based MAC price 
of £51 CO2e t−1 is used as the best single estimate to reflect the 2009 ‘business as usual’ case It is 
noted that the economic price of carbon has a significant effect on total soil degradation costs given 
the scale of potential soil carbon loss.} 
    UNITS: GBP/Mg 
Conversion_to_measure_cost_of_C_rather_than_CO2 = 0.273 




    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Cost_per_ton_of_new_nuisance_sediment_removal_capacity = 5.15 
    UNITS: GBP/Mg*Years 
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Cost_per_ton_of_nuisance_sediment_removal = 5.15 {Graves p6 ref to Anthony et al 2009} 
    UNITS: GBP/Mg 
Desired_nuisance_sediment_removal_capacity = 
(Nuisance_sediment_gap/Sediment_management_period)+Sediment_deposition 
    UNITS: Mg/Years 
Initial_Cost_of_nuisance_sediment_per_source_ha = 
INIT(Cost_of_nuisance_sediment_per_source_ha) 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Initial_Nuisance_Sediment = 27.3 
    UNITS: Mg 
Initial_Nuisance_Sediment_Removal_Capacity = 100 
    UNITS: Mg/Years 
Nuisance_sediment(t) = Nuisance_sediment(t - dt) + (Sediment_deposition - 
Sediment_removal_and_drain_clearance) * dt {NON-NEGATIVE} 
    INIT Nuisance_sediment = Initial_Nuisance_Sediment 
    UNITS: Mg 
    INFLOWS: 
        Sediment_deposition = 
Universal_Soil_Loss_Equation_USLE*Total_area_of_farmland_in_catchment_of_interest*Proportion
_of_sediment_deposited_in_unwanted_locations 
            UNITS: Mg/Years 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Sediment_removal_and_drain_clearance = Nuisance_Sediment_Removal_Capacity 
            UNITS: Mg/Years 
Nuisance_sediment_gap = Nuisance_sediment-Nuisance_sediment_target 
    UNITS: Mg 
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Nuisance_Sediment_Removal_Capacity(t) = Nuisance_Sediment_Removal_Capacity(t - dt) + 
(Nuisance_sediment_removal_capacity_building - Nuisance_sediment_removal_outdating) * dt 
    INIT Nuisance_Sediment_Removal_Capacity = Initial_Nuisance_Sediment_Removal_Capacity 
    UNITS: Mg/Years 
    INFLOWS: 
        Nuisance_sediment_removal_capacity_building = 
Nuisance_sediment_removal_capacity_expansion_needed 
            UNITS: Mg/Years/Years 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Nuisance_sediment_removal_outdating = 
Nuisance_Sediment_Removal_Capacity/Nuisance_Sedimental_Removal_lifetime 
            UNITS: Mg/Years/Years 
Nuisance_sediment_removal_capacity_build_time = 5 




    UNITS: Mg/Years/Years 
Nuisance_sediment_removal_capacity_gap = Desired_nuisance_sediment_removal_capacity-
Nuisance_Sediment_Removal_Capacity 
    UNITS: Mg/Years 
Nuisance_sediment_target = 0 
    UNITS: Mg 
Nuisance_Sedimental_Removal_lifetime = 40 
    UNITS: Years 
Proportion_of_sediment_deposited_in_unwanted_locations = 1 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
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Sediment_management_period = 1 




    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Supply_chain_risk_indicator = SOM_influence_on_mean_yield_variability/100 {Simple linear 
indicator expressing how change in potential yield variability due to influence of SOC could present 
supply chain risk e.g. for retailer of farm produce} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Total_area_of_farmland_in_catchment_of_interest = 330 {330 ha is the size of the Rothamsted 
Research site where RothC applied} 
    UNITS: Hectares 
Water_quality_and_flood_regulation_value = 
Accumulated_value_of_change_in_nuisance_sediment_removal 





Accumulated_ROI(t) = Accumulated_ROI(t - dt) + (ROI_Accumulation) * dt 
    INIT Accumulated_ROI = 0 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
    INFLOWS: 
        ROI_Accumulation = Farm_ROI_for_investing_in_SOM/ROI_spread_period 
            UNITS: Per Year 




    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Actual_K_inorganic_fertilizer_cost = K_inorganic_fertilizer_price*K_inorganic_fertilizer_demand 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Actual_N_inorganic_fertilizer_cost = N_inorganic_fertilizer_price*N_inorganic_fertilizer_demand 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Actual_P_inorganic_fertilizer_cost = P_inorganic_fertilizer_price*P_inorganic_fertilizer_demand 






    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Additional_annual_weed_management_cost_per_area = 2.50 {KeySoil Case 27} 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Additional_slug_management_cost_per_area = 0 {12.5 KeySoil Case 9 and 18 additional slug burden 
when adding crop residues or FYM} 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Annual_cost_of_ploughing_in_recoverable_plant_residues_per_area = 0 {KeySoil Case 9 refs to 
"small cost of ploughing in" and does not report therefore assumed to be covered in same as normal 
cultivation activity} 




    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 






    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Annual_number_of_soil_cultivation_treatments = 4 {Select 4 for conventional tillage (2x2 
treatments), 2.5 for reduced tillage (2x1 treatments), and 0 for no-till}  {Powlson et al 2011 "Recent 
surveys in England and Wales (Anon, 2006) show that c.50% of primary tillage practices used 
mouldboard ploughing (‘conventional tillage’) and c.43% used reduced tillage methods (i.e. heavy 
discs, tines or powered cultivators), with direct drilling/broadcasting (i.e. no cultivation) occurring on 
only c.7% of the tillage area. The reason that zero tillage has been less popular in the UK and 
northwest Europe, compared to the Americas and Australia, has been the build-up of grass weeds, 
crop disease problems and soil compaction, all of which decrease crop yields and appear to be more 
prevalent in a moister climate. Also the larger crop yields achieved in northwest Europe (often 8-10 t 
grain ha−1) leads to a larger quantity of straw which can cause problems of seedling emergence if 
left on the surface. The relatively small area that is under zero tillage in the UK is mainly calcareous 
clay soils that self-mulch as a result of wet-dry and freeze-thaw cycles, producing good tilth in a way 
not occurring on other soil types."} 





    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Base_fuel_consumption_per_treatment_per_hectare_of_cultivation = 30 {Ploughing up to 30 litres 
per ha https://www.swarmhub.co.uk/energy-efficiency-master/fuel-saving-stragies/} 




    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 

























    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Drought_resilience_value_of_SOM_for_yield_income_protection = 
Yield_protected_by_SOM*Price_per_crop_ton 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Farm_ROI_for_investing_in_SOM = 0 { 
((Annual_onsite_benefits_of_SOM_per_area/(Additional_annual_onsite_cost_for_investing_in_SO
M_per_area)*100)-100)} 
Jonathan D. Nichols / 263851 and s1030015 / European Master in System Dynamics / Master’s Thesis Page 113 
 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Farmer_CB_balance_for_investing_in_OM(t) = Farmer_CB_balance_for_investing_in_OM(t - dt) + 
(Farmer_Net_benefit_of_OM_per_hectare) * dt 
    INIT Farmer_CB_balance_for_investing_in_OM = 0 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares 
    INFLOWS: 
        Farmer_Net_benefit_of_OM_per_hectare = (Annual_onsite_benefits_of_SOM_per_area-
Additional_annual_onsite_cost_for_investing_in_SOM_per_area)*Farmer_Decision_to_make_CBA_
switch 
            UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Farmer_Decision_to_make_CBA_switch = IF(Farmer_Making_a_CBA=1) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Fuel_cost_for_compaction_relief_cultivation_by_area_with_efficiency = MAX(0, 
Base_fuel_costs_for_cultivation_by_area*Effect_of_SOM_compaction_regulation_on_cultivation_e
fficiency) 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Fuel_price = 0.502 {2017 annual average https://www.statista.com/statistics/527997/annual-
average-price-of-red-diesel-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/} 
    UNITS: GBP/Litres 
FYM_or_other_organic_amendment_handling_and_spreading_costs_per_area = 13  {Keysoil case 27 
collection and spreading costs £13/ha} 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Imported_FYM_or_other_organic_amendment_price_per_Mg = 2 {For price only use £2/Mg Set at 
£7/Mg for imported and spread turkey manure from KeySoil Case 20 for imported delivery and 
spread} 
    UNITS: GBP/Mg 
Inorganic_K_cost_saving = K_inorganic_fertilizer_cost_if_all_K_input_to_come_from_fertilizer-
Actual_K_inorganic_fertilizer_cost 
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    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Inorganic_N_cost_saving = N_inorganic_fertilizer_cost_if_all_N_input_to_come_from_fertilizer-
Actual_N_inorganic_fertilizer_cost 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Inorganic_P_cost_saving = P_inorganic_fertilizer_cost_if_all_P_input_to_come_from_fertilizer-
Actual_P_inorganic_fertilizer_cost 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
K_inorganic_fertilizer_cost_if_all_K_input_to_come_from_fertilizer = 
K_input_needed_to_maintain_cereal_yield*K_inorganic_fertilizer_price 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
K_inorganic_fertilizer_demand = MAX(0, (K_input_needed_to_maintain_cereal_yield-
K_release_from_OM)) 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
K_inorganic_fertilizer_price = 279 {AHDB GB Fertilizer Price Market Update April 2019 for Murate of 
Potash,  price for March 2019 https://ahdb.org.uk/fertiliser-information} 
    UNITS: GBP/Mg 




    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
N_inorganic_fertiliser_demand_sensitivity_to_N_release_from_OM = 0.05 {Experimental variable to 
simplify model structure since modelling soil N dynamics is itself a project with existing models and 
complex system dynamics - purpose of this variable is to enable accounting for savings on N fertiliser 
approximating those reported in relevant KeySoil case studies. Variable can be considered to 
account for processes such as leaching, nitrification/denitrification, mineralisation and N availability} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
N_inorganic_fertilizer_cost_if_all_N_input_to_come_from_fertilizer = 
N_input_needed_to_maintain_cereal_yield*N_inorganic_fertilizer_price 
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    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
N_inorganic_fertilizer_demand = MAX(0, (N_input_needed_to_maintain_cereal_yield-
(N_release_from_OM*N_inorganic_fertiliser_demand_sensitivity_to_N_release_from_OM))) 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
N_inorganic_fertilizer_price = 264 
    UNITS: GBP/Mg 
N_input_needed_to_maintain_cereal_yield = 0.156 {N inorganic fertilizer mean application rate for 
cereal crops of ~0.156 Mg/Ha 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/712349/fbs-fertiliseruse-statsnotice-31may18.pdf} 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
P_inorganic_fertilizer_cost_if_all_P_input_to_come_from_fertilizer = 
P_input_needed_to_maintain_cereal_yield*P_inorganic_fertilizer_price 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
P_inorganic_fertilizer_demand = MAX(0, (P_input_needed_to_maintain_cereal_yield-
P_release_from_OM)) 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
P_inorganic_fertilizer_price = 332 {AHDB GB Fertilizer Price Market Update April 2019 for 
TripleSuperPhosphate,  price for March 2019 https://ahdb.org.uk/fertiliser-information} 
    UNITS: GBP/Mg 




    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Perception_delay_for_CB_balance = DELAYN(Farmer_CB_balance_for_investing_in_OM, 1, 1, 0) 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares 









    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Potential_income_from_plant_residue_sales_by_area = 
Recoverable_crop_plant_residue*Price_per_Mg_of_plant_residue 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Price_per_crop_ton = 190 {190 barley,  25 for grass} 
{https://www.farminguk.com/MarketData/Cereals/MALTING-BARLEY_19.html} 
    UNITS: GBP/Mg 
Price_per_Mg_of_plant_residue = 6 {6 barley, 25 grass} {6 GBP/Mg Usual price per Mg according to 
KeySoil cases but thought to be overestimate due to costs of collection} 
    UNITS: GBP/Mg 
ROI_spread_period = 1 
    UNITS: Years 
SWITCH_Additional_costs_of_ploughing_in_recoverable_plant_residues = 
IF(Mean_annual_input_of_plant_residues>Unrecoverable_plant_residue) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
SWITCH_Additional_costs_of_using_FYM_or_other_organic_amendment = 
IF(Mean_annual_input_of_FYM_or_other_organic_amendment_when_on>0) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Unrecorded_CB(t) = Unrecorded_CB(t - dt) + (Unrecorded_net_benefit) * dt 
    INIT Unrecorded_CB = 0 
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    UNITS: GBP/Hectares 
    INFLOWS: 
        Unrecorded_net_benefit = Annual_onsite_benefits_of_SOM_per_area-
Additional_annual_onsite_cost_for_investing_in_SOM_per_area 





Accumulated_Cost_of_Policy_A(t) = Accumulated_Cost_of_Policy_A(t - dt) + 
(Cost_incursion_for_POLICY_A) * dt 
    INIT Accumulated_Cost_of_Policy_A = 0 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares 
    INFLOWS: 




            UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Accumulated_Cost_of_Policy_B(t) = Accumulated_Cost_of_Policy_B(t - dt) + 
(Cost_incursion_for_POLICY_B) * dt 
    INIT Accumulated_Cost_of_Policy_B = 0 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares 
    INFLOWS: 
        Cost_incursion_for_POLICY_B = POLICY_B_PES_to_Farmer 
            UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
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Auto_instigation_of_POLICY_A_without_cost_when_POLICY_B_activated = 
IF(SWITCH_POLICY_B=0)THEN 1 ELSE 0 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Conversion_acres_to_hectares = 2.471 
    UNITS: Acres/Hectares 
Cost_per_acre_for_farm_advisor = 7 {https://thefarmingforum.co.uk/index.php?threads/agronomy-
fees.31195/} 
    UNITS: GBP/Acres 
Cost_per_hectare_of_POLICY_A = Cost_per_acre_for_farm_advisor*Conversion_acres_to_hectares 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares 
Discount_factor = 1 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Introduction_year_POLICY_A = 2020 
    UNITS: Years 
Introduction_year_POLICY_B = 2020 
    UNITS: Years 
NPV_Policy_A_based_on_offsite_benefits(t) = NPV_Policy_A_based_on_offsite_benefits(t - dt) + 
(change_in_NPV_Policy_A) * dt 
    INIT NPV_Policy_A_based_on_offsite_benefits = 0 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares 
    INFLOWS: 
        change_in_NPV_Policy_A = Policy_A_Net_offsite_benefits*Discount_factor 
            UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
NPV_Policy_B_based_on_offsite_benefits(t) = NPV_Policy_B_based_on_offsite_benefits(t - dt) + 
(change_in_NPV_Policy_A_1) * dt 
    INIT NPV_Policy_B_based_on_offsite_benefits = 0 
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    UNITS: GBP/Hectares 
    INFLOWS: 
        change_in_NPV_Policy_A_1 = 
Policy_B_Net_offsite_benefits*Discount_factor*SWITCH_POLICY_B 
            UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
POLICY_A_Advice_to_farmer_on_benefits_of_returning_crop_residues = 
0+STEP(SWITCH_POLICY_A, Introduction_year_POLICY_A) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Policy_A_annual_costs = Cost_incursion_for_POLICY_A 




    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Policy_A_cost_period = 1 
    UNITS: Years 
Policy_A_Net_offsite_benefits = Policy_A_annual_offsite_benefits-Policy_A_annual_costs 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Policy_B_annual_costs = POLICY_B_PES_to_Farmer 




    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
POLICY_B_First_five_years_investment = 20+STEP(-20, 2025) 
    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
Policy_B_Net_offsite_benefits = Policy_B_annual_offsite_benefits-Policy_B_annual_costs 
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    UNITS: GBP/Hectares/Years 
POLICY_B_PES = 0+STEP((SWITCH_POLICY_B*POLICY_PES_proportion_of_value), 
Introduction_year_POLICY_B) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
POLICY_PES_proportion_of_value = 1 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
SWITCH_POLICY_A = 0 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
SWITCH_POLICY_B = 0 





Decomposition_rate_constant_BIO = (1/0.66) {0.66 per year} 
    UNITS: Years 
Decomposition_rate_constant_DPM = (1/10) {10 per year} 
    UNITS: Years 
Decomposition_rate_constant_HUM = (1/0.02) {0.02 per year} 
    UNITS: Years 
Decomposition_rate_constant_RPM = (1/0.3) {0.3 per year} 
    UNITS: Years 
Proportion_of_decaying_C_PM_BIO_rather_than_HUM = 0.46 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
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Rate_modifying_factor_Soil_cover = IF(Soil_cover_average_over_year>0.99)THEN 1 ELSE 0.6 {as in 
RothC - decided to keep as is} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Rate_modifying_factor_Temperature = 
47.91/(1+2.71828^(106.06/(Mean_annual_air_temp+18.27))) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Rate_modifying_factor_Topsoil_Moisture_Deficit = GRAPH(Topsoil_Moisture_Deficit) 
(0.00, 1.000), (5.00, 1.000), (10.00, 1.000), (15.00, 1.000), (20.00, 1.000), (25.00, 0.850), (30.00, 
0.700), (35.00, 0.550), (40.00, 0.400), (45.00, 0.200), (50.00, 0.200) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Soil_texture_adjustment_calculation = 1.67*(1.85 + 1.60*EXP(-0.0786*Soil_clay_content)) {the ratio 
CO2 / (BIO+HUM)} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Topsoil_Moisture_Deficit = IF (Mean_annual_rainfall-(0.75*Mean_annual_evaporation)) > 0 THEN 0 
ELSE ((Mean_annual_rainfall-(0.75*Mean_annual_evaporation))*-1) {coefficient of 0.75 does not 
change with CC is constant used in calc of topsoil moisture deficit - important thing that can change 
are rainfall and evap which can already use in developing scenarios,  coefficient does not have real 
world equivalent,  is only a constant in the calculation for convention} {"In the original RothC version 
the model is primed to run open panevaporation data, which was multiplied internally by 0.75 to 
give actual evapotranspiration. This scaling factor of 0.75 basically also accounts for the transfer of 
potential evapotranspiration to actual evapotranspiration. Herbst et al 2018" } 





Decomposability_of_incoming_plant_material_DPMRPM_ratio = 0.59 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
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Mean_annual_air_temp = 9 {average monthly temperature Degrees C from RothC guide Fig 2 } 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Mean_annual_evaporation = 49.8 {monthly mm from RothC guide p.13 averaged for year} 









    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Mean_annual_rainfall = Roth_mean_annual_rainfall*Drought_conditions 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Roth_mean_annual_rainfall = 58.7 {monthly mm from RothC guide p.13 averaged for year} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Soil_clay_content = 23.4 {percentage} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Soil_cover_average_over_year = 0.34 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Topsoil_depth = 23 {cm} 









"1-Cover_crop" = 1 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
"2-Cereal_crop" = 0.85 {"The calculated GB and regional straw production figures derived by this 
study represent potential straw production (t/ha @ 85% dry matter) assuming that all straw is 
harvestable" 85% of dry matter 
http://www.northwoods.org.uk/northwoods/files/2012/12/StrawAvailabilityinGreatBritain.pdf} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
"3-Fallow_No_residues_intended_to_be_returned" = 0.1 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Arable(t) = Arable(t - dt) + (Rotate_to_arable - Rotate_to_grass) * dt 
    INIT Arable = 750 
    UNITS: Hectares 
    INFLOWS: 
        Rotate_to_arable = Rotate_to_grass 
            UNITS: Hectares/Years 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Rotate_to_grass = ((Arable+Grassland)*Proportion_to_convert_to_grass)/Conversion_interval 
            UNITS: Hectares/Years 
Conversion_interval = 1 
    UNITS: Years 
Grassland(t) = Grassland(t - dt) + (Rotate_to_grass - Rotate_to_arable) * dt 
    INIT Grassland = 250 
    UNITS: Hectares 
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    INFLOWS: 
        Rotate_to_grass = ((Arable+Grassland)*Proportion_to_convert_to_grass)/Conversion_interval 
            UNITS: Hectares/Years 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Rotate_to_arable = Rotate_to_grass 
            UNITS: Hectares/Years 
National_Arable_Land(t) = National_Arable_Land(t - dt) 
    INIT National_Arable_Land = 6011000 {Total arable land in UK} 
    UNITS: Hectares 
National_food_production = Actual_harvestable_crop_yield*National_Arable_Land 




    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Proportion_to_convert_to_grass = 0.25 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Soil_Organic_Carbon(t) = Soil_Organic_Carbon(t - dt) + (OM_add - OM_decomp) * dt 
    INIT Soil_Organic_Carbon = 33.8 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares 
    INFLOWS: 
        OM_add = 
(Mean_annual_input_of_carbon_from_plant_residues+Mean_annual_input_of_carbon_from_FYM_
or_other_organic_amendment)*Soil_texture_adjustment_decays_to_BIO_and_HUM 
            UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
    OUTFLOWS: 
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        OM_decomp = (Soil_Organic_Carbon*Rate_modifying_factors)/Time_to_decomposition 
            UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
SWITCH_Crop_choice = 2 









IOM = 2.7 




    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Soil_texture_adjustment_decays_to_BIO_and_HUM = 1/(Soil_texture_adjustment_calculation+1) {1 
/ (x + 1) is formed as BIO + HUM} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Soil_texture_adjustment_evolves_to_C_emissions = 
Soil_texture_adjustment_calculation/(Soil_texture_adjustment_calculation+1) {x / (x + 1) is evolved 
as CO2} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
 
********** 




BD_in_Grams_per_cmcb = Soil_Bulk_Density*Conversion_Tonnes_per_m3_to_Grams_per_cmcb 
    UNITS: Grams/cmcb 
Conversion_cmcb_to_cmsq = 1 
    UNITS: cmcb/cmsq/Dimensionless 
Conversion_cmsq_per_hectare = 100000000 
    UNITS: cmsq/Hectares 
Conversion_Grams_per_cmsq_to_kg_per_cmsq = 0.001 
    UNITS: kg/Grams 
Conversion_kg_to_g = 1000 
    UNITS: Grams/kg 
Conversion_Tonnes_per_m3_to_Grams_per_cmcb = 1 
    UNITS: (Grams/cmcb)/(Mg/mcb) 
Conversion_tonnes_to_kg = 1000 
    UNITS: kg/Mg 
SOC_as_% = SOM_as_%*(1/SOC_to_SOM_conversion_factor) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
SOC_in_g_per_kg = SOM_in_g_per_kg*(1/SOC_to_SOM_conversion_factor) 
    UNITS: Grams/kg 
SOC_per_area = (RPM+DPM+BIO+HUM)+IOM  {Intrepet with ref to Minasny et al 2017 Soil carbon 4 
per mile - levelling off of seq beenefits as reach new equilibrium} 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares 
SOC_to_SOM_conversion_factor = 1.9 
{https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_can_I_convert_percent_soil_organic_matter_into_soil_C 
and paper https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016706110000388 } 
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    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Soil_mass_Grams_per_cmsq = BD_in_Grams_per_cmcb*Topsoil_depth*Conversion_cmcb_to_cmsq 
    UNITS: Grams/cmsq 
Soil_mass_in_kg_per_cmsq = 
Soil_mass_Grams_per_cmsq*Conversion_Grams_per_cmsq_to_kg_per_cmsq 
    UNITS: kg/cmsq 
SOM = SOC_per_area*SOC_to_SOM_conversion_factor 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares 
SOM_as_% = (SOM_mass_in_kg_per_cmsq/Soil_mass_in_kg_per_cmsq)*100  
{https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_does_one_convert_Soil_Organic_Carbon_SOC_from_to_
Kg_Ha} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
SOM_in_g_per_cmsq = SOM_mass_in_kg_per_cmsq*Conversion_kg_to_g 
    UNITS: Grams/cmsq 
SOM_in_g_per_kg = SOM_in_g_per_cmsq/Soil_mass_in_kg_per_cmsq 
    UNITS: Grams/kg 
SOM_mass_in_kg_per_cmsq = SOM_mass_in_kilos_per_hectare/Conversion_cmsq_per_hectare 
    UNITS: kg/cmsq 
SOM_mass_in_kilos_per_hectare = SOM*Conversion_tonnes_to_kg 





BIO(t) = BIO(t - dt) + (BIO_input - BIO_decay) * dt 
    INIT BIO = Initial_BIO 
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    UNITS: Mg/Hectares 
    INFLOWS: 
        BIO_input = 
(RPM_decay+DPM_decay+HUM_decay+BIO_decay)*Soil_texture_adjustment_decays_to_BIO_and_
HUM*Proportion_of_decaying_C_PM_BIO_rather_than_HUM 
            UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        BIO_decay = (BIO*Rate_modifying_factors)/Decomposition_rate_constant_BIO 




    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
DPM(t) = DPM(t - dt) + (DPM_C_inputs - DPM_decay) * dt 
    INIT DPM = Initial_DPM 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares 
    INFLOWS: 




            UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        DPM_decay = (DPM*Rate_modifying_factors)/Decomposition_rate_constant_DPM 
            UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
HUM(t) = HUM(t - dt) + (HUM_input - HUM_decay) * dt 
    INIT HUM = Initial_HUM 
Jonathan D. Nichols / 263851 and s1030015 / European Master in System Dynamics / Master’s Thesis Page 129 
 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares 
    INFLOWS: 





            UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        HUM_decay = (HUM*Rate_modifying_factors)/Decomposition_rate_constant_HUM 
            UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Initial_BIO = 0.393 {0.656 for eq and model analysis, 0.393 for Worst case policy from 2020, 1.96 for 
Best case policy at 2020 } 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares 
Initial_DPM = 0.115 {0.195 for eq and model analysis,  0.115 for Worst policy start in 2020, 0.542 for 
Best Case policy at 2020} 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares 
Initial_HUM = 16.9 {25.4 for eq,  16.9 for Worst Case start in 2020,  71.5 Best Case policy start in 
2020} {Herbst et al 2018 The only difference was that we did not assume steady-state equilibrium 
for the TOC stocks at the LE sites. This might be explained by the fact that the soils of the IM data set 
were actually not in carbon turnover equilibrium, even though the sites were explicitly chosen since 
they were under agricultural practice for at least 50 years. Experimental evidence exists indicating 
that it takes> 50 years to reach TOC equilibrium, even under continuous crop regime (Odell et al., 
1984).} 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares 
Initial_RPM = 2.66 {4.52 for eq and start, 2.66 for Worst Case policy at 2020,  15.1 for Best Case 
policy at 2020} 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares 
PM_decay = RPM_decay+DPM_decay 
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    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Proportion_of_FYM_already_HUM = 0.02 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Proportion_of_FYM_DPM_and_RPM = (1-Proportion_of_FYM_already_HUM)/2 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Proportion_of_PM_that_is_FYM = 
Mean_annual_input_of_carbon_from_FYM_or_other_organic_amendment/Total_organic_C_inputs 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Proportion_of_PM_that_is_plant_residues = 
Mean_annual_input_of_carbon_from_plant_residues/Total_organic_C_inputs 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
RPM(t) = RPM(t - dt) + (RPM_C_inputs - RPM_decay) * dt 
    INIT RPM = Initial_RPM 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares 
    INFLOWS: 
        RPM_C_inputs = (Mean_annual_input_of_carbon_from_plant_residues*(1-
Decomposability_of_incoming_plant_material_DPMRPM_ratio))+(Mean_annual_input_of_carbon_f
rom_FYM_or_other_organic_amendment*Proportion_of_FYM_DPM_and_RPM) 
            UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        RPM_decay = (RPM*Rate_modifying_factors)/Decomposition_rate_constant_RPM 
            UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Total_organic_C_inputs = DPM_C_inputs+RPM_C_inputs 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
 
 





a_component = SOM_as_% 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
b_component = 2 {b = structure code: (1) very structured or particulate, (2) fairly structured, (3) 
slightly structured and (4) solid Structure not described so assume 2} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
c_component = 2 {c = profile permeability code: (1) rapid, (2) moderate to rapid, (3) moderate, (4) 
moderate to slow, (5) slow and (6) very slow. Batcombe Soil Series From ERA 
http://www.era.rothamsted.ac.uk/Hoos/hfsoils#SEC2 and LandIS 
http://www.landis.org.uk/services/soilsguide/series.cfm?serno=109&sorttype_series=series_name } 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
C_Crop_management_factor = 0.1 {barley 0.1,  grass 0.004} {Morgan 2005 from NDR report p. 56 - 
for Barley 0.1-0.2} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Conversion_to_K_units_for_Soil_erodability = 1 
    UNITS: Mg*Hectares*Hours/(MJ*Hectares*mm) 
Conversion_USLE_to_annual = 1 
    UNITS: Years 
Initial_Topsoil_in_catchment = 
Initial_topsoil_on_site*Total_area_of_farmland_in_catchment_of_interest 
    UNITS: Mg 
Initial_topsoil_on_site = 2.62 {Top 23 cm of soil (i.e. soil depth) according to 
http://www.era.rothamsted.ac.uk/Hoos/hfsoils#SEC2 } 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares 
Jonathan D. Nichols / 263851 and s1030015 / European Master in System Dynamics / Master’s Thesis Page 132 
 
K_Soil_erodability_dynamic = ((2.1 * 10^-4 * (12-a_component) * M_component^1.14 +3.25 * 
(b_component-2) +2.5 * (c_component-3)) /759)*Conversion_to_K_units_for_Soil_erodability  
{After Renard et al 1997 and from InVEST guide  http://releases.naturalcapitalproject.org/invest-
userguide/latest/sdr.html#sediment-export} 
    UNITS: Mg*Hectares*Hours/(MJ*Hectares*mm) 
LS_Slope_length_gradient_factor = 1 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
M_component = 52 * (100-20) { (silt% + very fine sand%) * (100-clay%)  From 
http://www.era.rothamsted.ac.uk/Hoos/hfsoils#SEC2} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Net_C_sequestration_by_soil = Total_organic_C_inputs-C_emissions {need to differentiate C storage 
and Cseq Chenu et al 2019 Increasing O stocks in agri soils knowledge gaps and potential 
innovations} 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Normal_Topsoil_formation_rate = 0.612 {For starting in equilibrium} {Global av is 0.7 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/001670619290040E} 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
P_Support_practice_factor = 1 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
R_Rainfall_erosivity = 190 
    UNITS: MJ*mm/(Hectares*Hours) 
Total_Topsoil_in_catchment(t) = Total_Topsoil_in_catchment(t - dt) + (Topsoil_formation - 
Topsoil_erosion) * dt 
    INIT Total_Topsoil_in_catchment = Initial_Topsoil_in_catchment 
    UNITS: Mg 
    INFLOWS: 
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        Topsoil_formation = 
Normal_Topsoil_formation_rate*Total_area_of_farmland_in_catchment_of_interest 
            UNITS: Mg/Years 
    OUTFLOWS: 
        Topsoil_erosion = 
Universal_Soil_Loss_Equation_USLE*Total_area_of_farmland_in_catchment_of_interest  {Not 
robust to extreme conditions - but this is more of a "check structure" to see if the rest makes sense 
e.g. will look at the stock to see if it goes negative,  since if it does all of the topsoil on site will be 
gone. Structure is a way to check for extreme conditions} 











    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
BIO_CN_ratio = 8 {The aerobic heterotrophic bacteria are primarily responsible for the decay of the 
large amount of organic compounds generated on the earth's surface. These organisms typically 
have a C:N ratio of about 8:1 https://www.encyclopedia.com/environment/encyclopedias-almanacs-
transcripts-and-maps/c-n-ratio} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
BIO_nutrient_release = BIO_decay/BIO_CN_ratio 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
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Compaction_management_period = 1 {Time period in which farmer will try to get BD under control. 
Assume 1 year} 
    UNITS: Years 
Crop_plant_residue_Harvest_Index = 0.5 {McCartney et al 2006 approx for Barley % estimated from 
HI Additionally, in Saskatchewan HI is typically 400 to 450 g kg–1 for wheat, 450 to 500 g kg–1 for 
oat, and 500 to 550 g kg–1 for barley; although, depending on the cultivar, wheat can be greater 
than 500 g kg–1, and barley greater than 600 g kg–1 (B. Rossnagel, personal communication, 
University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK). } 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Crop_plant_residue_production = (Actual_harvestable_crop_yield/((1-
Crop_plant_residue_Harvest_Index)*100))*(Crop_plant_residue_Harvest_Index*100) 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Decompaction_effort_by_farmer = 
Decompaction_needed*Effect_of_SOM_compaction_regulation_on_cultivation_efficiency 
    UNITS: (Mg/mcb)/Years 
Decompaction_needed = 
Soil_compaction+(Soil_Bulk_Density_gap/Compaction_management_period) 
    UNITS: (Mg/mcb)/Years 
Difference_in_yield_variability = Initial_SOM_influence_on_mean_yield_variability-
SOM_influence_on_mean_yield_variability 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Drought_condition_indicator = IF(Topsoil_Moisture_Deficit > 0) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Drought_effect_on_yield_given_SOM_status = IF (Drought_condition_indicator = 0) THEN 1 ELSE (1-
(SOM_influence_on_mean_yield_variability/100)) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Drought_probability = Drought_years_during_frequency_time/Potential_drought_frequency 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
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Drought_years_during_frequency_time = 1 
    UNITS: Years 
Effect_of_SOM_compaction_regulation_on_cultivation_efficiency = 1-
(Soil_compaction_regulation_by_SOM/(Decompaction_needed+0.00000000001)) 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
FOR_CHECK_Recoverable_plant_residue_production_based_on_Hoosfield_correlation = 
0.362*Actual_harvestable_crop_yield-0.0974  {y = 0.3626x - 0.0974 and R² = 0.9399 based on 
Hoosfield5 straw collected from Rothamsted } {McCartney et al 2006 Harvest index (HI) is the 
proportion of grain yield to total above-ground biomass of a cereal crop. Harvest index allows for 
estimation of total straw, chaff and stubble yield from grain yield data. 
https://www.nrcresearchpress.com/doi/pdf/10.4141/A05-092 } 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
FYM_CN_ratio = 12.7 {For FYM 12.7 from ADAS manure and SOC report Appendix 3 Table 1 For 
Green compost 11.4 same source Table 3} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Gap_between_SOM_Bulk_Density_predictor_and_Soil_Bulk_Density = Soil_Bulk_Density-
SOM_Bulk_Density_predictor 
    UNITS: (Mg/mcb) 
HUM_CN_ratio = 12 {the figure for humus being roughly 10:1 although values from 5: 1 to 15: 1 are 
generally found in most arable soils http://www.soilmanagementindia.com/organic-matter-in-
soil/notes-on-the-carbon-nitrogen-c-n-ratio-in-soil/2524} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
HUM_nutrient_release = HUM_decay/HUM_CN_ratio 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Initial_Soil_Bulk_Density = 1.16 {UK soil observatory for Harpenden cell as 1.16 
http://mapapps2.bgs.ac.uk/ukso/home.html} 
    UNITS: (Mg/mcb) 
Initial_SOM_influence_on_mean_yield_variability = INIT(SOM_influence_on_mean_yield_variability) 
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    UNITS: Dimensionless 
K_content_of_FYM = 0.00839 {For FYM 0.00839 from ADAS manure and SOC report Appendix 3 
Table 1 For Green compost 0.00334 same source Table 3} 




    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Maximum_potential_harvested_yield = 7 {barley 7,  grass 13} {Use 4.78 for equilibrium model set up 
when residues can be returned not accounted for Pan influence of SOM on yield,  Use 6.2 for 5 year 
average,  use 7 for maximum "The combined total yield (winter and spring) for barley sits at 5.7 
tonnes per hectare for 2018, below the five year average of 6.2 tonnes per hectare, 7.0 tonnes per 
hectare in 2017" 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/747210/structure-jun2018prov-UK-11oct18.pdf} {Corresponds with max yields at Hoosfield 
http://www.era.rothamsted.ac.uk/Hoos/hoos_open_access } {7 is the one to use for text runs} {8.35 
for eq run} 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Minimum_Soil_Bulk_Density_for_UK_mineral_soils = 0.4 




    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
OM_BD_predictor_unit_conversion = 1 
    UNITS: (Grams/cmcb)/(Grams/kg) 
P_content_of_FYM = 0.00228 {For FYM 0.00228 from ADAS manure and SOC report Appendix 3 
Table 1 For Green compost 0.00112 same source Table 3} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 





    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Plant_residues_CN_ratio = 80 {80 barley straw,  20 grass} {Straw is 80:1 
http://www.ecofarmingdaily.com/carbon-nitrogen-ratio/} {Will need to set at another ratio if 
considering different types of crops e.g. beans,  or use of cover crops to add more N} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
PM_N_release_via_FYM = (PM_decay/FYM_CN_ratio)*Proportion_of_PM_that_is_FYM 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
PM_N_release_via_plant_residues = 
(PM_decay/Plant_residues_CN_ratio)*Proportion_of_PM_that_is_plant_residues 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Recoverable_crop_plant_residue = Crop_plant_residue_production*Residue_recovery_efficiency 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Residue_recovery_efficiency = 0.6 {barley} {Copeland & Turley Typically around 60% of the straw 
produced in-field can be recovered for other uses. 
http://www.northwoods.org.uk/northwoods/files/2012/12/StrawAvailabilityinGreatBritain.pdf and 
sense check "Recoverable cereal straw biomass on UK farms typically ranges from 2.75 – 4 t/ha 
depending upon crop type. Any remaining straw stubble is incorporated back into soil" } 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Soil_Bulk_Density(t) = Soil_Bulk_Density(t - dt) + (Soil_compaction - Soil_decompaction) * dt 
    INIT Soil_Bulk_Density = Initial_Soil_Bulk_Density 
    UNITS: (Mg/mcb) 
    INFLOWS: 
        Soil_compaction = 
(Soil_compacting_land_use_activities)*SWITCH_Soil_compacting_land_use_activities_0_off_1_on 
            UNITS: (Mg/mcb)/(Years) 
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    OUTFLOWS: 
        Soil_decompaction = Soil_compaction_regulation_by_SOM+Decompaction_effort_by_farmer 
            UNITS: (Mg/mcb)/(Years) 
Soil_Bulk_Density_gap = Soil_Bulk_Density-Soil_Bulk_Density_goal 
    UNITS: (Mg/mcb) 
Soil_Bulk_Density_goal = 1.16 {should be lower than 1.6 max as this is where restricts root growth} 
    UNITS: (Mg/mcb) 
Soil_compacting_land_use_activities = 0.36/12  {For PULSE USE " PULSE(0.36, 0.9, 1) " } {For Average 
over year use " 0.36/12" } {Value of 0.36 is used as maximum change in BD with <1%OM on Soane 
1990  - limitation is that this is linear function  } 




    UNITS: (Mg/mcb)/(Years) 
SOM_Bulk_Density_predictor = MAX((((-
0.0039*SOM_in_g_per_kg+1.2301)*OM_BD_predictor_unit_conversion)/Conversion_Tonnes_per_
m3_to_Grams_per_cmcb), Minimum_Soil_Bulk_Density_for_UK_mineral_soils)  {regression BD and 
OM line equation from Yang et al. 2014 Figure 4} 
    UNITS: (Mg/mcb) 
SOM_influence_on_mean_yield_variability = 23.626*2.71828^(-0.414*SOM_as_%)  {Pan et al 2009 
Figure 4 "normal climate region"} 
    UNITS: Dimensionless 
SOM_time_to_BD_rebound_following_disturbance = 3 {Experimental variable  Sensitivity analysis 
for cultivation efficiency suggested soil rebound time with incorporation of 2.8 plant carbon (straw 
added only as KeySoil Case 2) able to produce 20-30% cost saving on cultivation cost after 5 years} 
    UNITS: Years 
SWITCH_Soil_compacting_land_use_activities_0_off_1_on = 1 
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    UNITS: Dimensionless 
Unrecoverable_plant_residue = Crop_plant_residue_production*(1-Residue_recovery_efficiency)  
{Copeland & Turley Typically around 60% of the straw produced in-field can be recovered for other 
uses. http://www.northwoods.org.uk/northwoods/files/2012/12/StrawAvailabilityinGreatBritain.pdf 
and sense check "Recoverable cereal straw biomass on UK farms typically ranges from 2.75 – 4 t/ha 
depending upon crop type. Any remaining straw stubble is incorporated back into soil" } 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
Yield_protected_by_SOM = 
Maximum_potential_harvested_yield*(Difference_in_yield_variability/100)*Drought_probability 
    UNITS: Mg/Hectares/Years 
{ The model has 300 (300) variables (array expansion in parens). 
  In root model and 0 additional modules with 12 sectors. 
  Stocks: 22 (22) Flows: 30 (30) Converters: 248 (248) 
  Constants: 116 (116) Equations: 162 (162) Graphicals: 1 (1) 
  There are also 15  expanded macro variables. 
  } 
 
 
 
 
---END--- 
